Sinhalese – Tamil Relations in Lanka:
The ROOT CAUSES FOR CONFLICT AND
THE PROSPECTCS FOR A LASTING PEACE
in
WORKING FOR PEACE IN A CONFLICT-RIDDEN WORLD:
The Role of the Youth
Edited by Gnana Robinson
Kanyakumari Justice and Peace Publications (KJPP)
Communal Harmony Series 5
High Ground, Kanyakumari 629 702, South India
September 2009
The same republished as a
separate book under the title
The Tamils of Lanka
Their Struggle for Justice
and Equality with Dignity
Kanyakumari Justice and Peace Publications (KJPP)
Communal Harmony Series 7
High Ground, Kanyakumari 629 702, South India
April 2010
Foreword
Peace Trust, Kanyakumari organized an
International Conference on Conflict Resolution and Peace in October13-15, 2006
and invited papers from scholars hailing from the different conflict situations
in Asia and the Middle East. Though we had a speaker from Sri Lanka, who
briefly explained the situation in the country, he could not give us a paper.
Hence on the recommendation of friends from Sri Lanka, we approached Mr.
Santasilan Kadirgamar, an old friend of mine, a Tamil from Jaffna, who lives
through the struggle of the Tamils of Sri Lanka right from its beginning.
Santasilan Kadirgamar is an objective
thinker, who has taken utmost care to present only historical facts regarding
the struggle the Tamils of Sri Lanka had been going through. His only objective
is to see that the Tamils are able to live in that beautiful island country as
citizens with justice and equality with dignity. I am sure, readers and
researchers will find this book very useful.
This is an excerpt from the seminar
publications Working for Peace in a
Conflict ridden world: The Role of the Youths (pp.22-105, KJPP, 2009). A
Tamil version of this book is to come out soon. I thank the author for his
scholarly work.
Revd. Gnana Robinson,
General Editor,
Kanyakumari Justice and Peace Publications,
Peace Trust Kanyakumari, April 19, 2010.
Sinhalese – Tamil Relations in Lanka:
The ROOT CAUSES FOR CONFLICT AND
THE PROSECTCS FOR A LASTING PEACE
Santasilan Kadirgamar [1]
Introduction
It is now 61 years since the British withdrew from
Lanka. (1) This island was under European colonial domination
for 450 years. The Portuguese, the Dutch and finally the English conquered the
two Sinhalese kingdoms in the south and the Tamil Kingdom Kingdom of Kandy Ceylon India
Tens of thousands of Tamils have been killed from
1958. Estimates vary from a minimum of 70,000. The figure could be much higher.
Hundreds of thousands lost their homes, and have been internally displaced,
while waves of migration to several countries took place from 1958. It is
estimated that between 800,000 to a million Tamils from Lanka now live abroad
(including refugees in South India ). After
1983 when the country drifted to war between Tamil militant groups and the
state, hundreds of Muslims and Sinhalese have also been killed. The expulsion
of the whole Muslim community from Jaffna and
the rest of the Northern Province
Indian military intervention in 1987 was followed
by a militant Sinhalese uprising against the government, which resulted in the
massacre of over fifty thousand Sinhalese youth. By the late 1990s this
conflict in Lanka had become the ‘forgotten war’, or ‘the boring war’ to the
major international news agencies, foreign journalists and the great powers
including India India
It is attempted here to trace the causes and
underlying factors that have led to this conflict. This paper begins with a
discussion of ethnicity and nationalism in its Lankan context. The acts of’
discrimination enacted against the Tamils, and resistance by the Tamils to
these acts are explained. Tamil political demands and the growth of Tamil
militant movements are traced, Indian intervention and its failure to resolve
the problem, the several phases of the war and the factors that have led to the
present impasse are discussed.
Ethnicity and Nationalism
In the decade before Indian independence the Muslim
League evolved the ‘two-nation’ theory and demanded a separate state. The
Indian National Congress, Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru made a valiant
effort to preserve Indian unity placing emphasis on and educating the people on
the broad underlying unity, based on the cultural legacies of history.
Linguistic and religious diversity and the pluralistic nature of Indian society
were recognized during the long struggle for freedom. In Pakistan and Sri Lanka India Jaffna India
The emerging minute Ceylonese capitalist class and
the English educated elites, both Sinhalese and Tamil, were the ideal comprador
bourgeoisie. They were the “Brown Sahibs” (to use a term coined by a
distinguished journalist of that time) who imitated the English in their life
style, divorced from the languages, religions and culture of the masses. It was
to this class that peaceful transfer of power from the British took place. No
attention was given to ‘nation-building’. On the contrary in the very first
year of independence itself nation-destroying policies were set in motion.
Until the late 1970s it was customary in Lanka to
discuss what we have called the national question or the ethnic problem as one
of ‘communities’ and ‘communalism’. ‘Chauvinism’ and ‘communalism’ were
commonly used in a derogatory sense. It soon became evident that one man’s
nationalist was another’s ‘communalist’ or ‘chauvinist’. The left or socialist
movement addressed this issue using the well-known Marxist-Leninist term the
“national question”. In the 1980s, the preferred term that gained currency was
‘ethnicity’. It is beyond the scope of this paper to go into a full discussion
on ethnicity per se. A considerable
amount of writing and discussion is now taking place on this subject. But some
kind of definition is necessary in the context of the problem in Lanka. Here
ethnic identity is marked by four factors: language, religion, homeland and
history, including shared experiences, memories and beliefs, and often legends
and myths relating to the past. One may add another factor that promotes a
collective consciousness — discrimination and oppression.
The Tamil nationalism and the Sinhala nationalism
prevalent today is a twentieth century post-colonial phenomenon, But Sinhala
identity, particularly Sinhala-Buddhist identity, and Tamil identity have
strong roots in the past. However in defining Sinhalese and Tamil ethnic
identities one has to categorically and in unmistaken terms assert that the
Sinhalese and Tamil do not constitute two separate races. Racially they belong
to one stock that emerged in the sub-continent of India India India
From over two thousand years ago there were two
religions, Hinduism and Buddhism later Islam and Christianity came. There took
place through the centuries the peaceful evolution of three culturally
interacting major religio–linguistic groups: (l) the Sinhalese mostly
Buddhists. (2) The Tamils mostly Hindus, and (3) the Muslims. Christians
constitute about seven per cent of the total population. There are both
Sinhalese and Tamil Christians
The Nation-State in Crisis
In many parts of the world the fourth quarter of
the twentieth century witnessed the nation-state in a state of crisis. When
Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated President Bush made a much publicised remark
“What’s the world coming to,” In CNN’s programme Crossfire’ Senator Daniel P.
Moynihan, former U.S. Ambassador to India Eastern
Europe became acute. The world witnessed the violence ridden
break-up of Yugoslavia Western Europe
was imposed on Asian and African countries to suit the imperial interests of
the European colonial masters. Borders of states and provincial boundaries
within states were arbitrarily drawn. The mobility that went with changes in
the mode of production, such as the development of the plantation sector in
Lanka, enabled millions of people to move from one part of a region to another.
Notable examples are workers of Indian origin in Lanka and Malaysia
Having achieved political independence the states
of Asia and Africa have failed to evolve
structures of government based on their past historical experiences taking into
account the rich cultural and ethnic diversity that prevails in each one of
these countries. Instead, these states slavishly followed the European model of
the nation-state. With the exception of India Europe
culminating with the horrors of the Second World War. These wars resulted in
the slaughter of millions including acts of genocide against six million Jews.
This period also witnessed imperialist wars in Asia and Africa
by several European powers. Imperialism was rooted in extreme nationalism or
jingoism as was evident in Britain United States of
America in Vietnam ,
Cambodia , Iraq and Afghanistan
in the pursuit of what was perceived as its ‘national interest’, with the
slogan “God Bless America Europe
demarcated the boundaries of colonial territories. These colonial entities
became the new states of Asia and Africa . One
major cause for today’s conflicts is the way in which the European colonial
masters laid down the borders of the newly independent states of Asia . The Indo-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir, the
Sino-Indian border war of 1962, the question of East Timor and Indonesia (now
resolved), the plight of the Karens in Burma, the Kurds in West Asia and that
of the Moros in the Philippines are all similar legacies of colonial rule and
the state system that was created and left behind.
The states of Asia and Africa now appear destined
to repeat this violent history of Europe , its
nationalisms, the idolatry of nation-states inclusive of the powerful myth of
national interest, security and sovereignty, leading to oppressions of ethnic
minorities including genocide. Unlike India Europe
in never ending internal and inter-state conflicts that have imposed severe
hardships and sufferings on the people in these countries.
The nation-state and the so-called territorial
integrity of the state has taken precedence over the rights and welfare of
peoples, their languages, religions, cultures and way of life, in short their
human security, democratic and human rights. Nationalisms and
national-interests have become synonymous with the interests of the numerically
dominant ethnic group. Symbols of national identity such as the national anthem
and the national flag reflect the identity and aspirations of the dominant
ethnic group. Minorities have been relegated to second-class status, suffering
discrimination and in some cases conscious assimilation. When minority ethnic
groups have sought to resist, or to win their rights, brutal oppression has
been the answer leading to prolonged ethnic conflict and civil wars and that
ill-defined term ‘terrorist’ tagged to all forms of dissent. The tragedy of it
all is that oppressed minority ethnic groups in seeking to liberate themselves
have once again adopted the nation-state model in formulating their demands,
and have sought to oppress other minorities among them.
The conflict in Lanka provides a useful case study
of the failure of the nation-state model in Asia .
The decades after decolonisation have witnessed the emergence of Sinhala and
Tamil nationalisms in Lanka. The Tamils have demanded the right to
self-determination including secession. This in turn has led to an interminable
conflict that has resulted in unprecedented massacre and destruction in this
once relatively peaceful land.
Discrimination
The Soulbury (1947) constitution under which the
British gave independence to the country provided no safeguards to the
minorities. There was just one clause in the constitution that was supposed to
give protection to the minorities. Under section 29(2) parliament’s power to
make laws was restricted so that
No such law shall: (b) make persons of any
community or religion liable to disabilities or restrictions to which persons
of other communities or religions are not made liable: or (c) confer on persons
of any community or religion any privilege or advantage which is not conferred
on persons of other communities or religions. (2)
This in practice provided no safeguards. All the major acts, which the
Tamils viewed as discriminatory occurred under this constitution. It must be
said in fairness to the vast majority of the Sinhalese people that they were
being used as pawns in a sordid game of opportunistic power politics by the two
major political parties, the United National Party and the Sri Lanka Freedom
Party, that have dominated Lankan politics from 1948. The vast majority of
Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims shared a common poverty in a typical third world
setting, plagued by unemployment, including graduate unemployment, spiralling
cost of living, electricity and petrol today one of the highest in the third
world, inflation, inadequate housing, poor public transportation, ill-equipped
schools and scarcity of consumer goods. Some of these acts of discrimination
were consciously adopted to divert the attentions of the Sinhalese masses from
pressing everyday problems. From 1948 to 1972 there were five major issues that
eventually led to hardening of attitudes among the Tamils. These were (I)
Citizenship rights, (2) Language rights (3) State sponsored settlement of
Sinhalese in Tamil majority areas. (4) Economic Development and (5) Education
and Employment.
Citizenship
In 1948, the Ceylon Citizenship Act No. 18 of 1948
and the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act of 1949 were enacted.
The former laid down the law and prescribed qualifications necessary for
persons to become citizens of the country. Any Tamil could have been called
upon to prove his or her citizenship, though the Act was primarily directed at
excluding from citizenship the descendants of Tamil immigrant labour that had
been brought into Ceylon by
the British in the nineteenth century from South India ,
to work initially on the coffee plantations and later on the tea and rubber
plantations. The latter provided an opportunity to these people to obtain
“citizenship by registration” but the procedure was made cumbersome requiring
documentary evidence that practically made it impossible for most of these
people to become citizens. The Ceylon
Parliamentary Elections (Amendment) Act No.48 of 1949, deprived non-citizens of
their right to vote, thereby effectively disenfranchising a whole community of
mostly Tamil plantation workers. These people had exercised their right to vote
in 1931 and 1936, and in 1947 had elected eight Tamil members to parliament.
Their votes were decisive in electing Lanka Sama Samaja Party (Trotskyite
Socialist) and Communist Party members elsewhere, all Sinhalese to parliament.
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India
refused to accept these people as Indian citizens and declared that they
belonged to Ceylon by virtue
of their long period of residence in the country, many of them longer than
nineteenth century migrants to Australia ,
New Zealand , Canada and the U.S.A. British Empire
in which sizeable communities of Indians and Chinese lived. Tamils of Indian
origin today constitute large communities in Malaysia
and Singapore Ceylon
For decades both the Sinhalese and the Ceylon
Tamils benefited from the surplus generated through the exploitation of the
labour of these people in the tea plantations and their tragic history is a
slur on both communities in Lanka. The Ceylon Tamils made only token gestures
of support but never launched a major struggle on their behalf. They were the
poorest among the poor and the most exploited among the exploited. As the
distinguished theologian the Rev. Dr. D. T. Niles once asserted in the 1950s,
there would be no salvation for this country until justice is done to these
people.
Soon after Nehru died the government of India consequent to the border war with China South India and the balance
were to be granted Lankan citizenship.
These agreements were arrived at without consultations with the people
concerned or their trade union and political leaders. According to human rights
activists in India , in the
process of repatriation and arrival in South India these people were exploited
and their conditions in India
The process of granting citizenship to those
remaining in the country took several years and thanks to the efforts of the
late Mr. Thondaman and the Ceylon Workers’ Congress the process was completed
in the 1990s. The eventual granting of citizenship rights was partly due to the
fears on the part of the Sinhalese leaders that these people of “Indian origin”
without Lankan citizenship rights could he used by India whenever it suited its
interests to intervene militarily in Sri Lanka. Their numbers considerably
diminished, the Hill Country Tamils have been able to send a few
representatives to parliament. Educationally and in terms of their
socio-economic conditions, they remain one of the most backward in the
country.
By depriving the Hill Country Tamils (Malai Naattu Thamilar is the preferred
term used by Tamils, though they are often referred to as Tamils of Indian
Origin) of their citizenship rights and effectively disenfranchising them the
United National Party government led by D. S. Senanayake struck a double blow.
The working class based socialist movement in the country was permanently
weakened and Tamil representation in parliament was considerably reduced.
Sinhalese Declared the Only Official language
Before independence and immediately after it was
expected that English would be gradually replaced with Sinhalese and Tamil as
the languages of administration. This pledge given to the Tamils by Sinhalese
leaders was broken in 1956. Mr. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike had come to power on a
wave of Sinhala Buddhist nationalist fervour. He had formed a broad front
called the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna
(Peoples United Front) committed to a mixed programme which included socialist
objectives but also the demand that Sinhalese be made the only Official
Language. This came as a great shock to the Tamil people and was regarded as a
gross betrayal by all sections of Tamil society.
1956 marks the birth of a militant Sinhala
nationalism. But Sinhala nationalism at that time had a progressive content.
The restoration of the Sinhalese and Tamil languages to their rightful place in
the social, economic and political life of the country was desirable. This
meant replacing English and all that it stood for, in terms of power,
influence, jobs and status. English had been a symbol of superiority. But it
was more than a symbol. It was regarded as a powerful weapon in the hands of
the privileged English educated elite composed of Sinhalese, Tamils, Moors and
Burghers. The vast majority who spoke only Sinhalese or Tamil occupied humbler
positions in society.
In addition, the 1956 upsurge sought to demolish
cultural colonialism that had bred a slavish mentality among Ceylonese elites
in relation to the western colonizing powers. The positive and constructive
dimensions of the 1956 upsurge were lost when the slogan became SINHALA ONLY.
The ruling class manipulated a genuine movement for national revival and the
search for a national identity among the Sinhalese masses into a degenerate
anti-Tamil chauvinism.
In the perception of the Sinhalese masses the
restoration of Sinhalese to its rightful place was something more than
facilitating administration in the Sinhalese language. They perceived it as a
major step forward in the evolution of an egalitarian society. Such high
expectations were not realised. The 1971 insurrection in which 10,000 Sinhalese
youth lost their lives was an attempt, though a misguided one, to regain what
had been promised but never given in 1956. It was directed against the Sinhala
ruling class and not against the Tamils.1956 marked a major turning point in
the country’s history.
Prior to 1956 the leading schools in the Tamil
north voluntarily taught Sinhalese as a third language. The Tamils’ conscious
of their minority status, were getting ready for integration. It was in their
interests to study Sinhalese and they did so voluntarily. By 1956 several
students were taking examinations in the Sinhalese language in addition to the
Tamil and English languages at the grade ten Senior School Certificate
examinations. If this process had continued many Tamils would have become
trilingual. But ‘Sinhala only’ in l956 ended that process. Deeply hurt and
humiliated, Tamil public opinion called for a halt to the teaching of Sinhalese
to Tamil students as part of the resistance. The headmasters of the leading
Tamil schools jointly made a decision to terminate the teaching of Sinhalese in
all schools in the Tamil areas.
The language controversy left a lasting impact on the country. The
credibility of the Lankan state and its Sinhalese political leadership became a
major issue which inevitably made Ceylon
Land Development and Settlement
‘Sinhala Only’ in 1956 brought to the forefront
growing fears among the Tamils regarding the state sponsored land settlement
schemes, which the Tamils referred to as ‘colonisation’ that were taking place
in the Eastern province on a large scale and to a lesser extent in the Northern
province. The outbreak of anti-Tamil violence in one of the districts in the
Eastern province consequent to the communal tensions unleashed by ‘Sinhala
Only’ in 1956 aggravated these fears. In 1921 in the Eastern
province Sinhalese constituted 4.5%, the Tamils 53.5% and the Moors 39.42%. By
1953 the Sinhalese had increased to 13.1%, the Tamils reduced to 47.3% and the
Moors 38.1%. This process of consciously changing the ethnic composition of a once
Tamil and Moors (both Tamil-speaking) majority area took place rapidly in the
1950s. Fertile lands, with abundant water resources, were available in the
Eastern province. At close proximity to these lands were Tamil and Muslim
villagers. These lands using Official Development Assistance from the developed
countries were developed often with Tamil engineers and technicians responsible
for the execution of these projects. Once developed with the necessary
infrastructure Sinhalese people from other provinces were settled on these
lands. As a result one whole district Amparai had become a Sinhalese majority
area and a section of the Trincomalee district was also being rapidly converted
into a Sinhalese majority area.
This generated legitimate fears among the Tamils
that they could eventually be reduced to a minority in the eastern province. In
order to counter this danger the Federal party came out strongly with the
‘traditional homeland’ principle that has led to severe controversy. The Tamils
have claimed that the Eastern Province , including the district of Trincomalee with
its strategically located harbour, should constitute together with the Northern Province Eastern Province
Economic Development
With the exception of three industries set up as
state corporations (a cement factory, a paper factory and a chemical factory)
there has been no state sponsored industrialization in the Tamil north and
east. All the industrialisation and much of it with foreign aid, was in the
Sinhalese areas. The fishing industry in the Tamil provinces also remained
largely undeveloped. Tamil entrepreneurs who wished to establish private
industries were pressurized to establish their industries in the Sinhalese
areas. This was done through an elaborate system of control exercised by
government departments and bureaucrats over the import of machinery and raw
materials, in conformity to policies laid down by the government. The
infrastructure consisting of roads, railways, bridges, ports and
telecommunications remained largely in the condition in which they were in the
l940s. The Tamil people resident in the north and east in the 1970s and 80s
received nothing of the Official Development Assistance that the country was
getting both under bilateral and multilateral aid from the Developed Countries
including Japan
Education and Employment
One of the beneficial legacies of British rule was
the development of a reasonably good educational system in the country, though
primarily confined to urban areas. The constitutional changes granted in 1931
gave every person over the age of 21 the right to vote and a fair degree of
self-government to the country, education and health ministries among others
being held by Ceylonese. The left movement and affiliated trade unions acted as
pressure groups forcing the leaders of the land-owning wealthy classes who
monopolised political power to implement social welfare services patterned on
the British model. Two of these were free health services and free and
compulsory education. These were fully effective in the 1940s and laid the
foundation in making Lanka by the 1970s into a model Third
World country with high literacy rates (85%), low infant mortality
rates and life expectancy reaching between 65 and 70 years. The Physical
Quality of Life Index ranked it in 1979 (at 82 on a scale of 0- 100) as the
third highest among developing countries of Asia after Singapore and Taiwan, in
spite of the country’s low ranking by the more conventional GNP index. Keeping
military expenditure to a bare minimum facilitated this achievement. In the
first two decades after independence defence expenditure in Lanka was one of
the lowest in Asia and below one per cent of
GDP, and far below expenditure on education and health services.
But these achievements in education and the health
services had results that aggravated ethnic tensions. Population had doubled
from six million in 1946 to over 12 million in the 1970s. There was widespread
unemployment and at the same time an increasing demand for university
education. At the time of independence the percentage of Tamils in certain sectors
of employment was well over their percentage in the population. These were in
high-income professions such as medicine, engineering, law, banking and
accountancy. In the civil service and lower rungs of government service also
the Tamils were highly visible. But the Tamils who enjoyed these advantages
came primarily from the Jaffna and Colombo Jaffna
Peninsula Jaffna , second only to Colombo Eastern
Province Britain , the USA ,
Canada , Australia , New
Zealand and to several countries of the Commonwealth in
Asia and Africa , where they could work using
the English language. These Tamils were later to play a major role in
internationalising the plight of the Tamils, when ethnic conflict escalated in
the 1980s. In the first twenty-five years after independence Tamils employed in
the public sector dropped from between 20 and 30 per cent to under 10 per cent
and today even much less. In the security forces there are hardly any Tamils, a
mere handful in the police.
There was however no discrimination in the
educational system until 1971. Tamils had the right to have all their education
in Tamil in the same way as the Sinhalese. In this respect the position of the
Tamils was much better than that of ethnic minorities in Malaysia Jaffna Jaffna
By 1971 there were only five universities in the
country, all state universities. There was no affiliated College system as in India Sri Lanka
For many years prior to 1971 the admission of Tamil
students to the faculties of medicine, engineering and science was
percentage-wise higher in relation to their ratio in the population. This again
created a lot of heart burning among the Sinhalese with elitist aspirations. In
1971 the number of Tamil students qualifying for admission to the faculty of
engineering reached an unprecedented figure of over 40 per cent. The figures
for medicine were also high. Mrs. Bandaranaike’s government, which was in
power, evolved a scheme that was openly discriminative. Tamil students were
required to get more marks (approximately 25 points more) than Sinhalese
students to enter these highly competitive faculties. This was open and blatant
discrimination, and was the final blow that radicalised Tamil youth, and marked
the beginnings of Tamil youth militancy.
The university admission scheme was revised, and a
district quota scheme became effective after 1977, giving special weightage to
backward areas. But this change in the context of prevailing ethnic tensions
did little to remedy the situation. Tamil students continued to compete and
entered universities though in reduced numbers. The more politically motivated
quit schools and entered the armed struggle.
Political Demands
From the very beginning in1948 Tamil political
leaders had demonstrated willingness to compromise. The Tamil Congress split
into two when the faction led by G.G. Ponnambalam decided to accept office
under the United National Party Government led by D.S. Senanayake. Ponnambalam,
held the prestigious post of Minister of Industries and was instrumental in
establishing the three major industries (all seriously damaged in the present
war) ever established in the north and east.
The task of mobilizing Tamil public opinion against
the Citizenship Acts fell to the other faction led by S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, who
founded the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi
(Federal Party) in 1949. Chelvanayakam made the prophetic assertion that the
discriminatory acts against the Hills Country Tamils (the deprivations of their
citizenship right) was a sign of what was in store for the Ceylon Tamils. The
F.P. made the categorical assertion that the Tamils were a distinct nation. The
first National Convention held in Trincomalee in 1951 adopted the following
resolution:
“Inasmuch
as it is the inalienable right of every nation to enjoy full political freedom
without which its spiritual, cultural and moral stature must degenerate, and
inasmuch as the Tamil-speaking people in Ceylon constitute a nation distinct
from that of the Sinhalese by every fundamental test of nationhood, firstly,
that of a separate historical past in this Island at least as ancient and as
glorious as that of the Sinhalese by every fundamental test of nationhood,
secondly, by the fact of their being a linguistic entity entirely different
from that of the Sinhalese, with an unsurpassed classical heritage and a modern
developed language which makes Tamil fully adequate for all present day needs,
and finally by reason of their territorial habitation of definite areas which
constitute over one-third of this Island, this first National Convention of the
Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi demands
for the Tamil-speaking nation in Ceylon their inalienable right to political
autonomy and calls for a plebiscite to determine the boundaries of the
linguistic states in consonance with the fundamental and unchallengeable
principle of self-determination.”
The resolution further stated:
“The I.T.A.K. recommends to the Tamil-speaking
people the feasibility and desirability of establishing the autonomous Tamil
linguistic state within the framework of a Federal Union of Ceylon, as the
rational and natural culmination of centuries of close association between
these two nations in this their common motherland and with a view to promoting
and maintaining national goodwill and close co-operation with the Sinhalese
people.”(4)
In the period after 1956 The Federal Party commanded the support of most
Tamils. The four major demands of the F. P. were: (I) A Federal Constitution,
(2) Sinhalese and Tamil to be Official Languages (3) An end to the state
sponsored colonization of Tamil areas, and (4) Citizenship Rights to all Hill
Country Tamils.
From the very beginning the party demonstrated
willingness to compromise and accept a certain degree of autonomy within the
framework of an united Lanka, without yielding on the principle that the
Tamil-speaking people constituted a nation. The party remained committed to
non-violent forms of struggle adopting the Gandhian method of satyagraha and
civil disobedience.
The two major Sinhalese parties, the UNP and the
SLFP, rejected these demands. The LSSP and CP both parties with a multi-ethnic
membership and a following all over the island accepted the language and
citizenship demands, but rejected the other two. But Sinhalese leaders like
Bandaranaike (SLFP) in 1956 and Dudley Senanayake (UNP) in 1966 knew that
injustice had been done to the Tamils. They were aware that there would be no
peace and stability unless some of the demands of the Tamils were met. But
having stirred up powerful nationalist/chauvinist sentiments among the
Sinhalese people they were not able to concede the just demands of the Tamils.
When one party tried to arrive at a settlement the other blocked it to win
electoral support among the Sinhalese people. Sections of the powerful and
influential Buddhist priesthood prevented a peaceful settlement. The Federal
Party organized several non-violent campaigns between 1956 and 1976. The major
non-violent struggles were in 1956, 1957, 1961, and 1976 when the leaders of
the party courted arrest.
The Bandaranaike - Chelvanayakam Pact
In 1957 Prime Minister Bandaranaike anxious to
resolve the Tamil issue, made an agreement with FP leader Chelvanayakam. The
B-C Pact, as it came to be known, was a timely and appropriate compromise. In
providing for Regional Councils with a fair degree of autonomy acceptable to
the Tamils and making possible the amalgamation of the northern and eastern
provinces under one council it could have laid the foundations for a peaceful
solution to the emerging problem. Land settlement schemes were placed within
the jurisdiction of the regional councils and thereby guaranteed that residents
of the district will be given first preference. Tamil was recognized as the
language of a national minority, which in practice would make it the language
of administration in the northern and eastern provinces. This pact became the
model when every subsequent attempt was made to arrive at a compromise within
the framework of an United Lanka, and still provides a viable basis for a
political solution.
But Bandaranaike’s opponents wrecked the agreement
by stirring-up powerful anti-Tamil passions among the Sinhalese people.
Prominent among these opponents was J. R. Jayewardene, who later became
President, and his United National Party. Hundreds of Buddhist monks
demonstrated opposite Bandaranaike’s residence forcing him to withdraw the
agreement. The degree of autonomy and the unit of devolution that was conceded
in the B-C pact figured prominently in the lndo-Sri Lanka Agreement of 1987,
and constitute the main issue on which both sides are unable to arrive at an
agreement in the present crisis.
Anti-Tamil Violence and Civil Disobedience
The B - C Pact, its abrogation and subsequent
events led to the first major anti-Tamil violence in 1958. This brutal episode
left permanent scars on Tamil society. Pirapakaran, the leader of the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, has stated in his interviews that it was
childhood memories of atrocities committed in 1958 against Tamils, including
members of his family that largely influenced his resort to armed struggle.
Following the riots of 1958, the Bandaranaike
government, having placed the Tamil leaders under detention, enacted The Tamil
Language (Special Provisions) Act No.28 of 1958 giving some language rights to
the Tamils. Bandaranaike was assassinated by a Buddhist monk in 1959 and was
succeeded by his widow Sirimavo Bandaranaike. Mrs. Bandaranaike came to power
without any political experience and had nothing of the liberal education or
values of her husband. During her two terms in power (1960-65 and 1970-77) she
totally ignored, in fact aggravated, the grievances of the Tamils. The seeds of
Tamil separatism took root in her period in office.
In 1961 the Federal party launched its prolonged
and most successful civil disobedience campaign. It was a mass campaign
involving students, trade unions, farmers and workers and the general public.
Civil administration came to a standstill in the north and east. Mrs.
Bandaranaike’s government responded, with a massive show of force. Tamil
leaders were arrested. A forty-eight hour curfew was imposed followed with an
all night curfew for several weeks. There were several incidents of the armed
forces robbing, looting and assaulting Tamils. Here were the early beginnings
of what the Tamils perceived as ‘state terrorism’, which was to become
pronounced and frequent in the 1980s and thereafter.
But Lanka at this time was a lively parliamentary
democracy. The violation of human rights and the sufferings of the Tamils were
raised in parliament by Sinhalese members of the LSSP and the CP. Though there
was a rigid press censorship, parliamentary privilege was upheld and the
newspapers were required to report speeches made in parliament. The revelations
made in parliament, forced the government to halt this phase in the repression
of the Tamil people. But the fundamental grievances of the Tamil people
remained without a solution.
Coalition Politics
The 1965 general elections resulted with no party
having an absolute majority, the kind of result that the FP looked forward to.
The FP preferred a coalition with the UNP. The Dudley Senanayake - Chelvanayakam
Pact was an attempt to revive the B-C pact, which the UNP had opposed in 1957.
The coalition lasted until 1968. The SLFP now found that it was in its
interests to oppose the Dudley - Chelvanayakam Pact. The SLFP with its
socialist allies, the LSSP and CP, organized a massive demonstration in Colombo
opposing the Dudley - Chelvanayakam Pact. It was a repetition of 1957, this
time the parties involved were on opposite sides. This became the sordid game
played by Sinhalese leaders in office and their main opposition. The Tamils
became the football to be kicked around.
The mid-1960s saw a major change in the political
situation. The socialist left consisting of the LSSP and CP after having
championed the rights of the Tamils for over three decades gave up their
principled support for the Tamils. The leaders of these parties were not
Sinhala chauvinists. They were adopting the time honoured centrist tactic of
allying with the centrist SLFP to defeat the capitalist UNP. In doing this they
were prepared for tactical reasons to give up their support for the Tamils. The
results, which we are able to see today, were disastrous both for the left
movement, the Tamils and the country as a whole. The parties of the left were
the only unifying force in the country. One may add the Christian churches, but
the church was not an active player in the political field. The left leaders,
in parliament and through their publications, set a political climate that
helped to contain the violence. Island wide, the left movement had a following
among all ethnic communities.
The existence at a strong left movement committed
to Tamil rights gave a sense of security to the Tamils. In allying with the
SLFP and in opposing the Dudley - Chelvanayakam Pact, these parties lost the
confidence of the Tamil people and consequently a substantial working class and
electoral base in the Tamil areas. The Tamils found themselves politically
isolated and drifted to separatist politics in the 1970s.
In 1970 the coalition of the SLFP-LSSP-CP swept the
polls and formed a United Front Government on a radical program of economic and
social reform. The United Front government did nothing to remedy the grievances
of the Tamils. In fact the enactment of the 1972 Republican Constitution
aggravated the situation and was felt by the Tamils to be a total betrayal.
The 1972 Constitution
One of the first acts of the United Front
Government was to alter the system of admissions to the universities as
indicated above. Twenty-five years of discrimination with regard to citizenship
rights, language rights, land settlement, economic development, employment and
now university education naturally created great discontent among Tamil youth.
It must be however stressed that the economic conditions under which large
masses of the Sinhalese people lived were in many ways no better. But the
Tamils had the additional grievance of being discriminated against, humiliated
and finding themselves reduced to a second-class status in their own country on
ethnic grounds. Among the few jobs available, the Tamils were not getting their
share. Tamil professionals and intellectuals frankly believed that given their
share of foreign aid and other resources they could have developed their part
of the country rapidly. The issue therefore by the early 1970s became one of
self-determination with the right to the highest degree of autonomy possible.
The enactment of the 1972 Republican Constitution
with the left in power marked the turning point in Tamil consciousness. The
failure to consider the provision of regional autonomy resulted in Tamil
representatives in the constituent assembly staging a walkout. Far from meeting
the aspirations of the Tamils, the constitution made things worse by enshrining
Sinhala Only as the official language in the constitution. In addition an
entirely new provision was written into the constitution giving Buddhism a
special place in the state.
The country’s name was officially changed from ‘Ceylon ” to “Sri Lanka Jaffna
Self-Determination and the Secessionist Demand
Facing almost total isolation and with negligible
support within the dominant Sinhala nation the Tamils drifted towards a
declaration in favour of secession. The FP and the TC had finally come together
to form the Tamil United Liberation Front. The TULF at its first National
Convention held at Pannakam, Vaddukoddai on the 14th of May 1976 declared that:
“The Tamils of Ceylon by virtue of their great
language, their religions, their separate culture and heritage, their history
of independent existence as a separate state over a distinct territory for
several centuries until they were conquered by the armed might of the European
invaders and, above all, by their will to exist as a separate entity ruling
themselves in their own territory are a nation distinct and apart from the
Sinhalese and this convention announces to the world that the Republican
Constitution of 1972 has made the Tamils a slave nation ruled by the new
colonial masters, the Sinhalese, who are using the power they have wrongly
usurped to deprive the Tamil nation of its territory, language, citizenship,
economic life, opportunities of employment and education, thereby depriving all
the attributes of nationhood of the Tamil people.”
The Convention further resolved that:
“the restoration and recognition of the Free,
sovereign, secular, socialist State of Tamil Eelam based on the right of
self-determination inherent to every nation, has become inevitable in order to
safeguard the very existence of the Tamil Nation in this country”.(5)
The tone and content of the above suggests that this resolution was
framed more in anger and frustration rather than after rational thought
weighing all the possible consequences of such an extremist demand. The federal
demand in stressing autonomy within the framework of one state was the correct
demand. In making a demand for a separate state the TULF committed a major
political blunder. This could not be achieved through democratic and
parliamentary means or through armed struggle that has now been going on for
more than thirty years. The demand for a sovereign state made it impossible for
the TULF and the Tamil groups involved in armed struggle thereafter to withdraw
this demand with self-respect and without earning the tag ‘traitor’.
In making the demand inadequate attention had been
paid to the experience in the Indian subcontinent. The creation of Pakistan and subsequently Bangladesh Pakistan and Bangladesh India , Pakistan and Bangladesh
State Violence and Counter-Violence
Prior to 1977 most of the anti-Tamil violence was
in the Sinhalese areas, though there were some exceptions. In and after 1977
the violence was more systematic and well planned. In 1977 a major target for
attack had been helpless and unorganized plantation workers, who were later
evacuated to the Vavuniya district (in the Tamil northern province Jaffna Jaffna
In July 1977 the UNP under the leadership of J. R.
Jayewardene was returned to power defeating Mrs. Bandaranaike. Ironically
Jayewardene assumed power with the slogans ‘Saviour of the Nation’ and highly
publicized promises of a ‘Just and Righteous Society’. Far from saving the
‘nation’ his twelve years in power saw the final destruction of what could
still have been a united Lanka. He came to power with substantial support from
the Tamils resident in the predominantly Sinhalese provinces. These people
trusted Jayewardene and believed that he would find a solution to the problems
they faced. He had promised an all party Round Table Conference. The new 1978
Constitution failed to resolve the problem. Instead, sporadic acts of’ violence
by Tamil groups labelled “terrorism” by the state became the excuse for
increasing repression through the enactment of the Prevention of Terrorism Act,
the provisions of which were indiscriminately used, leading to widespread
violations of human rights that further pushed Tamil youth in the direction of
secession.
The Tamils had been a docile people who from 1956
to 1977 did not fight back. When attacked in the Sinhalese areas they ran for
their lives, sought protection in refugee camps and returned to the safety of
their own homelands in the north and east. The Sinhala dominated state provided
no compensation for loss of lives or property. Hurt, humiliated and
discriminated against for two decades they began to lose faith in democratic
processes and the futile attempts made to seek solutions through negotiations.
The result was the growth of Tamil militant movements.
The Tamil Armed Organisations
Known as Tamil militant movements these had their
origins in the early 1970s. The main groups by the 1980s were:
(I) The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
(2) The Peoples’ Liberation Organization of Tamil
Eelam (PLOTE)
(3) The Eelam Peoples’ Revolutionary Liberation
Front (EPRLF)
(4) The Eelam Revolutionary Organization (EROS)
(5) The Tamil Eelam Liberation Front (TELO)
(6) The Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front
(ENDLF)
The Tamil United Liberation
Front (TULF), which won the 1977 elections, remained the only unarmed group
that was a significant player in the political scene for the next ten years.
Some of these groups had common origins, others
evolved separately. There were several splits and regroupings in later years.
In terms of ideology and programme it is difficult to label them because of the
changing positions they have taken from time to time. The EPRLF and EROS were
initially at least theoretically committed to a Marxist programme, and
significantly did not use the name Tamil Eelam. Eelam and Ilankai
are names in Tamil for the whole Island
of Lanka Tamil Eelam
Kumar David giving in 1987 a characterisation of
the most important groups lists the following general features they have in
common. They are:
2. An internal mix of Tamil nationalist, Marxist
and broad democratic currents, with wide differences in the ‘ratios’ of the
mix.
4. Armed units and a commitment to armed struggle
and a mix between the methods of ‘terrorism’ and ‘liberation war’.
5.
Relationships with the central government in Delhi
and the State government in Tamil Nadu and with Indian political parties,
especially in South India , (this was largely
true until Indian military intervention in 1987)
6. Financial support from the expatriate Tamil
community in the US , Europe and elsewhere; links with Palestinians and other
liberation organizations (in the early stages) and certain states. (6)
All the groups began primarily with a student and youth base. Their
history has been marked with internecine conflicts resulting in the massacre of
hundreds of Tamil youth by rival organisations. The leaders of TELO (in 1985)
and EPRLF (1990) were assassinated by the LTTE. The PLOTE leader (in 1989) was
also killed by hitherto unidentified men. The Indian state in the period 1983
to 1987 is known to have assisted some of these groups through its intelligence
agents. Political leaders in the state of Tamil Nadu are suspected of having
given assistance. From 1990 Sri Lankan government sources appear to have either
financed or supplied with arms Tamil groups cooperating with the state.
All the groups have been committed
towards-liberating’ the Tamil people and until 1987 had a common enemy - the
Sri Lankan state and its armed forces. But since 1987 they have been involved
in naked power struggles switching allies as and when it suited their
interests. In 1987 when India India Sri Lanka
Tamils not involved in armed struggle but
politically involved have been liquidated by the LTTE. The leader of the TULF
A. Amirthalingam, widely respected and most senior among Tamil politicians, was
assassinated by the LTTE in July 1989 together with the popular former member
of parliament for Jaffna V. Yogeswaran, who in the 1970s and early 80s risked
his life in safeguarding militant Tamil youth. Several other politicians of the
TULF have been killed. Human rights activists, members of the socialist
parties, administrative service officials, university teachers and others have
been killed or have disappeared, all victims of Tamil armed organizations. What
began as a struggle for democratic and human rights for the Tamils has now
degenerated into indiscriminate violence in which Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims
have become victims. The wiping out of the un-armed Tamil democratic leadership
by Tamil Armed Organisations has created a vacuum in Tamil society and
prospects of building up a democratic leadership remain bleak at the present
juncture. This is a major crisis facing Tamil society today.
The Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement
In July 1983 in retaliation for the killing of thirteen
Sinhalese soldiers by the LTTE massive violence described as a holocaust was
unleashed against the Tamils in which thousands lost their lives and many more
their homes, livelihood and property. Thousands of Tamils including leading
politicians fled to South India . Tamil
refugees found refuge in several European countries as well. Mrs. Gandhi, prime
minister of India India Thimpu ,
Bhutan 1986. In July 1987
somewhat hastily and without adequate preparations and consultation with the
Tamil groups the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement was announced. President Jayewardene
and Rajiv Gandhi signed the agreement in Colombo July 29, 1987 .
The Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF), landed in the north and east of Lanka.
The main features of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement
to establish peace and normalcy in Sri Lanka
1. To preserve the unity, sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Sri
Lanka
2. Acknowledged that Sri Lanka
3. Recognised that the Northern and the Eastern Provinces
4. Subject
to a referendum the Northern and Eastern
Provinces
5. The official language of Sri Lanka
The agreement further provided for the surrender of arms by the Tamil
militant groups to the IPKF, and the confinement of the Sri Lankan security
forces to barracks. A general amnesty was declared for all political prisoners
held under the Prevention of Terrorism Act and Emergency Laws. India will ensure that Indian territory is not
used for activities prejudicial to the unity, integrity and security of Sri Lanka India India
Welcomed by world opinion and internationally
acclaimed the provisions of the agreement were seen by many Tamils, the left
movement and human rights organizations as a major step forward in resolving
the ethnic conflict. Several international human rights groups and NGO’s
concerned shared similar sentiments. The Indian troops received a warm welcome
in the north and east. The LTTE was not happy about the agreement from the very
beginning, but accepted it under Indian pressure, The LTTE for sometime had
been making the claim that it should he recognised as the sole representative
of the Tamil people. This was not acceptable to the other Tamil groups and the
Governments of Sri Lanka and India
The whole story of what happened is a sad and
tragic episode in the history of the Tamils and their friendly relations with India India ’s longest
war as noted by Indian writer Rajesh Kandian in a penetrating analysis of “India Sri Lanka island of Sri Lanka 1:30 . (7)
Some two to three thousand Tamil civilians (estimates vary) were killed
by the protector (IPKF) turned ruler. Both the Indian government and its armed
forces discredited themselves. They either did not have the necessary
intelligence services or skill, or did not have the will to fight the LTTE,
which has been known for its tight internal discipline, tactics of guerrilla
warfare, and suicidal attacks on the enemy. Two Indian army officers Major
Shankar Bhaduri and Major General Afsir Karim have commented that the
weaknesses of Indian policy were marked by a lack of diplomatic finesse, lack
of a coherent response, a frequent drift in policies due to inadequate
background study or a well-defined foreign policy.” In addition they are of the
opinion that relevant paragraphs of the agreement suggest a degree of ambiguity
in the military- oriented clauses. They state that Indian army contingents
landed in Sri Lanka
There is some truth to the claim made that the
Indians were fighting a war with one hand tied behind their backs. Questions
have been raised as to whether the Indian army was under orders not to destroy
the LTTE totally. This could have been possible in deference to public opinion
in Tamil Nadu. It is also possible that India was keeping its options open for
the future in the light of the hostile attitude of Sri Lankan governmental
leaders, particularly that of the later President Premadasa (Prime Minister in
the 1987-88 period). The fact that in an unprecedented move the Indian army
brought detained LTTE leaders and cadres from South India
and set them free in northern Lanka lends credence to this view. The Indian
State, the Lankan State and the LTTE and the other Tamil organizations,
especially the EPRLF drifted into a game of power politics, for influence and
hegemony at the expense of the lives of innocent and helpless civilians. This
power struggle did not serve the national interests of either India
Meanwhile in the Sinhalese provinces the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (Peoples
Liberation Front) was carrying on a war against the ruling party and all other
political groups that had supported the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement. The state
retaliated with brutality. People, especially youth, disappeared by the
thousands. What had begun as a conflict in which Sinhalese soldiers killed
Tamils and Tamil armed organizations killed Sinhalese soldiers, and at times
civilians, had now become one in which Sinhalese killed Sinhalese and Tamils
killed Tamils and Indians killed Tamils. It is now estimated that over sixty
thousand people, mostly Sinhalese, died in the two years from 1987 to 1989.
In 1988 presidential elections were held. Mr.
Premadasa was elected President in a closely fought election defeating Mrs. Bandaranaike.
In the NE province the conditions were not conducive for free and fair
elections. Parliamentary elections followed resulting in the UNP getting a
majority. President Premadasa’s government succeeded in destroying the
leadership of the JVP and put a stop to its violent activities. He began a
dialogue with the LTTE and succeeded in getting their co-operation in demanding
the withdrawal of the IPKF. Meanwhile Rajiv Gandhi lost the elections in India
Without sympathy and support in India, and without
the kind of support they received from international human rights and
non-governmental organizations (prior to the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement) the
Tamils became totally isolated and at the mercy of the Sri Lankan state on the
one hand and the LTTE on the other as they engaged in a brutal war. The
credibility of the LTTE and other Tamil armed organizations became low among
foreign governments and international human rights organizations because of
their own extensive violations of human rights of the Tamils, Sinhalese and
Muslim people.
Premadasa Government and the post-IPKF period
“From
Indo-Lanka Accord onwards, the LTTE has been the main impediment to a negotiated
peace and a political solution to the ethnic problem; had Mr. Pirapakaran been
a little less intransigent, the war could have ended if not in 1987, definitely
in 1989 or 1994 or 2002. The other impediment to a peaceful resolution of the
conflict, Sinhala supremacism, was not dominant within the polity or society
during this period and it was Tiger maximalism which kept the country and the
Tamils locked in a war benefiting neither”(9)
The above comment, made by a
reputed Sinhalese journalist known for the stand she has taken in favour of
justice to the Tamils sums up what happened in the two decades after the
Indo-Lanka Accord. The lost opportunities loom large as Sinhala supremacism gained
ground in the last three years, which together with other factors have placed
the Tamils in the hitherto unprecedented predicament they are in today.
Premadasa, an opponent of the Indo-Sri Lanka
Accord, was elected President in 1988. He and the LTTE having become uneasy
allies called for the withdrawal of the Indian forces. Talks between the
Premadasa Government and the LTTE began in May 1989 and lasted until June 1990.
The Premadasa government supplied arms to the LTTE to fight the IPKF and the Tamil
organizations that collaborated with the IPKF. In March 1990 the IPKF finally
withdrew.
The negotiations lasted from May 1989 to June 1990.
The final withdrawal of the IPKF took place in March 1990. The LTTE overnight
took over several of the camps and centres installed by the IPKF and
established its control over large areas once controlled by the IPKF.
The Sri Lankan Security forces and the LTTE were at
war again. This phase of the war has been referred to as Eelam War II.
It became a brutal war .
Hundreds (estimates vary) of Sinhalese and Muslim
policemen were killed after they had surrendered. The government placed an
embargo on food and medicine entering the Jaffna Peninsula
Government
forces retaliated. Along roadsides burning bodies became a common sight.
Government or paramilitary death squads kidnapped or killed Sinhalese or Tamil
youth suspected of being JVP or LTTE sympathizers.
In what became a major blunder in October 1990, the
LTTE expelled all
the Muslims residing in Jaffna. This amounted to a total of 28,000 Muslims (again estimates vary
depending on which side one is on) were forced to leave their homes leaving
behind all their possessions.
In one of the largest battles of the war in July
1991, the LTTE attempted to take without success the Elephant Pass base,
which controlled access to the Jaffna
In February 1992, a series of government offensives failed
to capture Jaffna Jaffna Peninsula
The security forces this time bombed and shelled
Tamil areas resulting in heavy casualties. Supplies and essential items like
petrol, vital consumer goods, medicines etc. were scarce in Jaffna Jaffna
Internecine conflict among the Tamils led to the
assassination of prominent Tamils. These include Amithalingam leader of the
TULF, Yogeswaran one time popular M.P for Jaffna South India .
Most publicized was the assassination of Rajiv
Gandhi in 1991. This had enormous consequences for the LTTE and more than any
other single act eventually sealed its fate. India India
Meanwhile hundreds of Tamil Youth languished in
state prisons under the draconian regulations of the Prevention of Terrorism
Act and frequent Emergency rule, which gave extra-ordinary powers to the
state’s security forces. The LTTE in the post IPKF period had consolidated its
rule over large chunks of territory in the North and East. They had effectively
established an administration of their own, especially over the Jaffna Peninsula University
of Jaffna Australia and Canada Canada so much so that by the end of the 1990s Toronto alone had over two hundred thousand Tamils, these
figures exceeding that of the city of Jaffna Toronto
Where the institutions of government were concerned
including the service sector such as hospitals, schools, banks, the meagre bus
services etc run by the state, a dual administration prevailed. The flow of
basic goods was maintained by the state, and when the land route was closed by
sea. The railway services to Jaffna 1990. A
dedicated band of Tamil administrative officials at the local level kept vital
supplies moving in the Tamil homeland. These men and women served at great
personal risk to their lives saddled with the unenviable task of serving two
masters. Some of them paid for these services with their own lives caught in
the crossfire and in some cases were assassinated. The salaries of all
government employees, including pensions were paid by the state. But these same
employees were subject to the dictates of the LTTE as and when they found it
necessary.
The Peoples’ Alliance
It was in
this scenario that a major political change took place in the country. The UNP
after a rule of 17 years was defeated and the Peoples’ Alliance
Never had a government come to power with such
goodwill and hope. The TULF independent of the LTTE welcomed this new
government and immediately initiated a dialogue. In fact the Tamil people at
large looked upon this government with favour. The LTTE issued a statement
welcoming the election and as a gesture of goodwill declared a weeklong unilateral
cease-fire on 12 November
1994 , the date on which Ms. Kumaratunge took oaths as President.
Talks began in October 1994. In negotiating with
a tough and battle-hardened adversary the new government’s approach was marked
by an absence of professionalism bordering on amateurism, failure to lay down a
clear conceptual framework, and what appears in retrospect a lack of
commitment, the talks came to a disastrous end. The hopes evoked were frittered
away within one year. In April 1995 the LTTE unilaterally withdrew from the
talks. With the resumption of hostilities the government launched a major
offensive. In a much publicised incident in August 1995, Air Force jets bombed
St. Peter's church at Navali in Jaffna
After seven weeks of heavy fighting Jaffna
Facing defeat in Jaffna Jaffna Peninsula Jaffna
Peninsula
The battle front moved to the Vanni. The LTTE
launched the Operation Unceasing Waves and took control of Mullaitivu in July 1990. In May 1997, 20,000 government troops tried to open the A9
road that linked Jaffna to Colombo
Meanwhile attacks continued allegedly by the LTTE
using suicide cadres and time bombs in the city of Colombo
In January 1996, took place the attack on the Central Bank in Colombo , killing
90 and injuring 1,400, sending shock waves to the professional and upper middle
classes in Colombo
The Sri Lankan World Trade Centre in Colombo 1997. In
January 1998, the Temple of the Tooth in Kandy
On September
27, 1998 the LTTE launched the Operation Unceasing Waves II and
captured Kilinochchi which
thereafter became the capital of LTTE controlled territories in the North until
its fall in January 2009.
In March 1999 the government tried once again to regain
territory in the Vanni, but without much success.
With the Operation Unceasing Waves III in 1999 the LTTE
rapidly gained control of nearly the entire Vanni region. The LTTE launched
several successful attacks in the region which culminated in the overrunning of
the Paranthan Chemicals Factory base. Thousands were killed in the fighting.
They also began their advance north towards Elephant
Pass and Jaffna
In December 1999 the LTTE attempted to assassinate
President Chandrika Kumaratunga in a suicide attack at an election rally. She
lost one eye, among other injuries, but was able to defeat opposition leader Ranil Wickremesinghe in the Presidential election and was re-elected
for her second term in office.
In April 2000 the Elephant
Pass Elephant Pass causeway was the vital narrow strip, which had
separated the Jaffna Jaffna
The army then launched an operation to take back
the southern Jaffna
Peninsula Jaffna ,
and many feared it would fall to the LTTE, but the military repulsed LTTE
offensives and was able to maintain control of the city and substantial parts
of the Peninsula . The year 2000 marked the
total destruction of the once thriving town of Chavakachcheri ,
the second largest urban centre in Jaffna
In the Vanni the LTTE eventually established its
impregnable quasi-state of ‘Tamil Eelam’, with its own administration,
judiciary, police force and taxation system. In developing sea power and a
mini-air force the LTTE had the distinction of being the first and only guerrilla
movement in the world to have developed these attributes of statehood. Having
lost large sections of the historic Jaffna
Peninsula
Cease Fire 2001
Leader of the UNP Ranil Wickremasinghe had
campaigned on a platform for peace and a negotiated settlement. Some years
earlier Thondaman senior had suggested that the LTTE be given ipso facto
power over areas under their control for ten years in exchange for cessation of
hostilities. Both President Chandrika Kumaratunga Bandaranaike and Ranil
Wickremasinghe had also expressed similar sentiments on different occasions. In
fact Premadasa had at one time stated in Tamil “Ellam Tharalam” (all can
be given, Ellam sounding like Eelam!) The message was that the essence
of power as perceived in the status quo, short of secession, could be
conceded through a compromise that did not dictate a constitutional settlement.
How serious these leaders were about such feelers
to the LTTE is open to question. They were constantly involved in a sordid game
of power politics. But beneath the everyday humdrum of politics was a brutal
reality that this war at that point in time was not winnable, and if at all
possible would have to be at tremendous cost in lives, resources, and loss of
international goodwill.
Ideally the leaders of the two major parties the PA
(SLFP) and the UNP should have arrived at an agreement with a maximum consensus
to be offered to the LTTE in particular and the Tamil people at large. Such a
compromise was arrived at in 2000 for the first time in fifty years when the
two parties sat down for six months and drafted a constitution. Known as the
2000 constitution it remains the single substantial document to be tabled in
parliament providing for a federal form of government. Short of just three
provisions that failed to satisfy the TULF, it provided the basis for a
solution. The LTTE ignored this exercise since they were not consulted. But
when the bill came before parliament Ranil Wickremasinghe and the UNP betrayed
the whole process. It was a stab in the back for Chandrika Kumaratunga. The
whole process broke down. Nor did the frontline leadership of Chandrika
Kumaratunga’s government, with the rare exception of a few speakers, back this
on the floor of parliament. Nevertheless this draft constitution still remains
the basis, which with suitable amendments can provide a constitutional
settlement that satisfies Tamil aspirations.
Why did this attempt fail? For fifty years party
rivalry, marked by family bandyism, nepotism, patronage and the consequent
corruption prevailed. In short political opportunism that sacrificed long term
gains for short term interests dominated the politics of both parties. The national
question did not receive priority. Neither of these two parties in fifty years
had ever held a party conference to debate the national question and evolve a
consensus within their own parties. And this was the most important issue that
was tearing the country apart. To that extent there was no internal democracy
or informed and rational policy making.
This was unfortunate since Sinhalese
majoritarianism and ultra nationalism had toned down in the post 1994 period.
The JVP and the Sihala Urumaya (Sinhala
Heritage) that stood to the far right opposing any devolution of power were
weak at this point in time. The press had become relatively free after
seventeen years of authoritarian rule ( including an extension of the life of
parliament elected in 1977 through a referendum held in 1982) by the UNP. Human
rights groups and civil society had regained a new lease of life. These
positive dimensions that emerged were frittered away by the Chandrika
Kumaratunga government and the Ranil Wickremasinghe opposition, primarily
occupied with their petty squabbles and personality clashes.
Meanwhile a multiplicity of factors led to the
ceasefire and subsequent talks. War fatigue had taken its toll with both sides
having reached a stalemate. The ruthless battles of the year 2000, and the
impunity with which the LTTE were able to inflict substantial damage in a tight
security zone such as the Bandaranaike International Airport, had created for
both the government and the LTTE the need for some breathing space and hence the cessation of
hostilities. A well known and highly respected left theoretician Hector
Abhayavardhana as early as in the 1960s remarked that Lanka’s capitalist class
lacked self-confidence. One may add they lacked patriotism and loyalty to the
country in contrast to their counter-parts in several Asian countries such as
in India , China , Japan
and notably Singapore USA Sri Lanka
chose Norway
The dissolution of parliament and the ensuing
parliamentary elections resulted in the rival UNF (the UNP with dissident
members of the PA who crossed over and formed an alliance named the United
National Front) forming the government in December 2001. The LTTE declared
their willingness to explore measures for a peaceful settlement to the
conflict.
As a result of efforts made by Norway
Memorandum of Understanding
The two sides formalized a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) on 22 February, 2002 and signed a
permanent ceasefire agreement (CFA). Norway
Commercial air flights to Jaffna India and the USA
Ranil Wickremasinghe gave a major press conference
striking an optimistic note, but in spite of repeated questions refused to
commit himself to an overall constitutional settlement. But continuously
pressed for an answer he was driven to drop a hint at the end of the
conference. The constitutional settlement he admitted was already there.
Obviously he meant the provisions of the 2000 constitution which his own party
had sabotaged for narrow political gains.
Pirapakaran, leader of the LTTE, in one of his
extremely rare public appearances and under tight security, held a
much-anticipated international press conference in Kilinochchi on April 10, 2002 . Balasingam
functioned as the interpreter but in reality turned out to be more spokesperson
than interpreter. Pirapakaran spoke in Tamil, and by no means a person with
oratorical skills, he faltered and looked up to his long time associate. A
two-sentence answer by Pirapakaran was paraphrased and expanded into a
lengthier piece by Balasingam, who was carried away by the event and his
enhanced status. Experienced observers and analysts were aware that what
Balasingam said did not count. But Pirapakaran said little of significance and
he gave away nothing. The press conference proved to be a major disappointment,
There was, however, a new mood in the country as
tens of thousands of Tamils both from within the country and abroad took this
opportunity to visit Jaffna University
of Jaffna , were the pride of Jaffna Jaffna
People who returned or went on a visit Jaffna Colombo Colombo Jaffna
Land values that had hit rock-bottom at the height
of the war, skyrocketed. A lacham of land (2,227 sq. ft: that is 16 lachams equaling one acre) on the
outskirts of the Jaffna Municipal limits went up from SL Rs.100,000 in 1999 to
Rs.300,000 in 2002 and hit a high of Rs.1.5 million by 2003- 04. Obviously
speculators and contractors were involved.
Trade and tourism flourished. Even Sinhalese people
visited Jaffna in large numbers, some for
sightseeing and out of curiosity, but most went on pilgrimage to the famous
Buddhist temple in Nagadeepa (Nainativu in Tamil, an island off the Jaffna Peninsula Jaffna Jaffna fruits and vegetables were once again available in Colombo , and a variety of consumer items hardly available
in the war years filled the shops in Jaffna
Peace Talks
The LTTE was de-proscribed on September 6, 2002 and the way was laid
open for direct negotiations with the LTTE. Talks consisted of six rounds from
September 2002 to March 2003. They were (1) Sattahip. Thailand September 16-19,
2002. (2) Bangkok , Thailand November 03, 2002 .
(3) Oslo , Norway Dec. 2-5, 2002 . (4) Bangkok ,
Thailand January 06-09, 2003 (5) Berlin , Germany
February 7- 8, 2005 (6) Hakone, Tokyo March 18-21, 2003 .
The GoSL team consisted of Ministers G.L.Peiris,
Milinda Moragoda, Rauf Hakeem and Peace Secretariat head Bernard Goonatilleke.
The LTTE was represented by Anton Balasingam, S .P. Tamilselvam, Adel
Balasingam, V. Rudrakumaran, Jay Maheswaran and Vinayagamoorthy Muralidaran
(Karuna Amman)
A fundamental weakness in the whole process was
that the Executive President of the State, Chandrika Kumaratunga was excluded
from the process. The 1978 constitution drafted by the Jayawardene government,
it has often been remarked, was tailor made for the then incumbent president,
politically a deeply insecure man who had to fight all his life to reach the
position at the apex which he finally reached in his seventies. With undated
letters of resignation from every one of his MPs in his possession he drafted a
constitution that gave extra-ordinary powers to the executive president. He
abolished the old Westminster
2001 was a rare instance when the chances for
cohabitation emerged with the president belonging to one party and the PM to
another. But it did not work. This became one vital reason why the peace
process broke down.
Internal Self-Determination
As Sumanasiri Liyanage has commented: “The most
significant and noteworthy development at the third round of talks was the
agreement … to explore the possibility of a federal solution to the national
conflict. The statement issued by the Royal Norwegian Government on December 5, 2002 has the
following:
‘Responding to a proposal by the leadership of the
LTTE, the parties agreed to explore a solution founded on the principle of
internal self-determination in areas of historical habitation of the
Tamil-speaking peoples, based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka.
As a means of achieving the above, it was agreed to
initiate discussion on substantive political issues including: (a) Power
sharing between the centre and region as well as within the centre. (b)
geographical region (c) human rights protection (d) political and
administrative mechanism (e) public finance and (f) law and order’
Conflicting interpretations have been given to the
above agreement. It was immediately perceived as a step forward. On the other
hand it was perceived as too good to be true, that the LTTE would drop its
secessionist demand. Balasingam in his book “War and Peace” later explained
that the LTTE always include both the internal and external aspects when it
talked about the right of self-determination, and was quick to add that “if
this element of self-determination is blocked or denied and the demand for self
rule is rejected we have no alternative other than to secede and form an
independent state.” (10)
The Talks Break Down
The Tigers had expected to be participants in the Washington USA there was no way in which an official
delegation from the LTTE could have participated at a meeting in the USA USA USA by Norway USA and possibly Japan
(often known to act as proxy for the USA
in Asia ) and other powers as key actors.
Nor were the full
economic rewards of peace reaching the LTTE. The LTTE’s position was that
progress had to be made on the ground before the settlement proceeded.
On April
21, 2003 the LTTE unilaterally withdrew from the peace talks.
Though invited to the Tokyo Donor Conference on June 5, 2003 , the LTTE refused to participate.
This was in spite of repeated appeals by the Japanese negotiator Yasushi Akashi
who was a frequent visitor to Kilinochchi in this period. Though the
negotiations failed and cease-fire held.
The Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA)
On October 31, the LTTE announced its own peace
proposal, calling for an Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA). This was the
first time in twenty years of war and peace talks that the LTTE submitted a
comprehensive document. The preamble consisting of 26 paragraphs and the 23
clauses were couched in moderate language. The tone was by no means
belligerent. Of the 23 clauses 13 were more or less conceded under the
provincial councils system established under the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. Seven
clauses were grey areas that given good will could have been negotiated. Three
clauses in particular were red areas that any Sri Lankan government would have
found it difficult to concede.
These were clause 1.The Interim Self-Governing
Authority (ISGA( shall be established
comprising of the eight districts namely Amparai, Batticaloa, Jaffna,
Kilinochchi, Mannar, Mullaitivu, Trincomalee, and Vavuniya in the Northeast,
until final negotiated settlement is reached and implemented. This in the
Sinhalese perception was asking for too much territory – the one major
stumbling block in all negotiations. Tamil Eelam maps published by the LTTE
claimed more than these territories covered by these eight districts. Sinhalese
spokespersons were of the view that the Ceylon
or Ilankai Tamils constituted just about 12 per cent of the Islands
population, and a fair number were living in the other provinces.
The extent of territory claimed must be seen in the
context of the composition of the ISGA proposed by the LTTE. This was to be
composed of 2.2 a .
Members appointed by the LTTE. 2.2 b.
members appointed by the GOSL, and 2.2 c. members appointed by the Muslim
Community in the Northeast. The number of members will be determined to ensure
2.3.a. an absolute majority of the LTTE appointees in the ISGA. 2.2.b. Subject
to (a) above, the Muslim and Sinhala Communities in the North East shall have
representations in the ISGA.
Most controversial was article 18. Marine and
off-shore resources. The ISGA shall have control over the maritime and offshore
resources of the adjacent seas and the power to regulate access thereto. This,
from the point of the view of the government, challenged the very sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the state. No Sinhalese government could have
conceded the latter.
The ISGA did not receive the political response it
deserved from the either of the major parties. But it has been commented upon
by some of the leading analysts in the country. Here we give the gist of
comments by three Sinhalese long-time academics.
Uyangoda was of the view that “many of these
proposals do not fall within the framework limits as set out in Sri Lanka’s existing
constitution … the LTTE was biased towards “self rule” as opposed to “shared
rule” ... and went far beyond ... the existing understanding of federalism as
shared rule…That proposition was based on the LTTE’s nationalist commitment to
sharing state sovereignty. (11)
Sumanasiri commented that for Uyangoda “the LTTE is
not a conventional counter-state military actor. He in fact sees the LTTE as an
organisation whose core characteristics are guided by its quest for political
legitimacy, political dignity and political parity.. and that Uyangoda calls
for a state restructuring framework … a confederal type of state within which
the LTTE’s present military structure can be accommodated. Sumanasiri added
that the ISGA went beyond an “administrative arrangement” and was in fact
closer to a final settlement. It sought to go beyond what is called internal
self-determination.
Dayan Jayatileke’s main focus, says Sumanasiri, is
not the content of the ISGA proposal and the powers the LTTE seeks, but the
core characteristics of the LTTE. He wrote: “the ISGA plus the Tiger army and
navy equals a separate state“. The ISGA minus the Tiger army and navy is
something that can be accommodated with modifications. So, it isn’t the ISGA
problem: i.e., “interim self rule” for the Tamils, that’s the real problem:
it’s the Tigers, their suicide bombers, artillery, and navy with its kamikaze
boats potentially capable of perforating the artery of strategic commerce
between the Straits of Hormuz and the Straits of Malacca. (12)
Sumansiri added that Dayan Jayatileke preferred an
internationally supervised decommissioning as part of any deal on the ISGA and
that he stands for self rule with substantial powers conditioned on
decommissioning the LTTE.
Pro-LTTE analysts have asserted that the ISGA was
put forward for negotiations. Proposals after a prolonged war are pitched high.
The Government of Sri Lanka instead of inviting the LTTE for negotiations and
finding the space for a negotiated agreement turned down the proposals. This strengthened
the perception among the Tamils that neither Ranil Wickremasinghe nor Chandrika
Kumaratunga had the will for a negotiated settlement. The LTTE by demanding
that they alone were the sole representatives of the Tamil people played into
the hands of the state. There were several dissenting groups among the Tamils
that had rejected the sole representative status for the LTTE.
The Ceasefire, and the consequent ISGA proposals
provoked a strong backlash among the hard-line elements in the South, who accused
Prime Minister Wickremasinghe of handing the North and East to the LTTE. Chandrika Kumaratunga ever waiting for an
opportunity to regain power declared a state of emergency and took three key
government ministries, the Ministry of Mass Media, the Interior Ministry and
the crucial Defence Ministry. She then formed an alliance with the JVP. This
was named the United
People's Freedom Alliance. The JVP was opposed to any talks with the LTTE advocating a harder
line and called for fresh elections.
The parliamentary elections, held on April 8, 2004 , resulted in
victory for the UPFA. Mahinda Rajapakse was appointed Prime Minister. But the new government expressed its
desire to continue the peace process and find a negotiated settlement to the
conflict.
Split in the LTTE
2004 marked a turning point in the history of the
conflict. Two developments in 2004 weakened the LTTE, paving the way for the
2009 debacle. The first was the breakaway of the Eastern Province
Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, better known as
Karuna Amman, had led the LTTE in several spectacular battles against the armed
forces Hailing from the Eastern Province
he had his own base and following in this region. Friction occurred between his
wing and the primarily Jaffna 1956, a long standing and
eloquent platform speaker for the FP, following dissension within the party
accepted a ministership in the Jayewardene government of 1977. This marked the
first major rift among the evolving Tamil Eelam nationalists.
This time it was Pirapaharan's trusted battle
hardened lieutenant Karuna, who pulled out an estimated four to five thousand
eastern cadres from the LTTE. It is generally believed that a power struggle
had surfaced and that Karuna alleged that insufficient resources and power were
being given to Tamils of the east. The LTTE made counter accusations.
Sometime after the talks with President Premadasa
had failed, charges of treason were made against Mahattaya, the deputy leader
of the LTTE. He with hundreds of cadres loyal to him had surrendered to the
leadership. They were detained and eventually Mahattaya and several of his
cadres were executed. Karuna obviously aware of the fate that awaited him did
not respond when summoned to the headquarters in the Vanni.
The loss of large chunks of territory in the Eastern Province Jaffna Jaffna
The LTTE pilot Rooben, of the plane that crashed in
Colombo
Mao compared guerrillas to fish in the sea. With
the loss of the East the LTTE had ceased to control a substantial segment of
the ‘sea’ in which the guerrillas thrived. A large number of the Tamils fleeing
from the war zone had found fresh ‘waters’ that no doubt were inhospitable and
insecure. But decisions were made not by choice but by necessity as they moved
to the Western Province
The Tamil diaspora had internationalized the issue.
Characterized by organizational expertise and commitment these Tamils marched
by the thousands with banners held high, on the streets of the major cities in
Europe, North America and Australia
A major civil war among the two factions of the
LTTE seemed imminent. But after some clashes Karuna disbanded his forces, and
initiated a process of co-operating with the state, a process consolidated in
2008. Soon another split occurred within the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Puligal (Tamil Peoples Liberation Tigers) that
Karuna had founded. His deputy Pillayan took control of the movement. But both
Karuna and Pillayan have separately linked themselves with the state.
The LTTE was not able to regain its domination in
those areas in the east that it once controlled. The TMVP contested the
provincial council elections held in the Eastern Province
The Tsunami of 2004
On December
26, 2004 , the Indian Ocean Tsunami
hit Sri Lanka Island
inhabited mostly by Tamils and Muslims. Both LTTE controlled territory and
government controlled coastline had been devastated. Disagreements arose instantly over how aid
from abroad should be distributed to the Tamil regions under LTTE control.
In June 2005 the government and LTTE agreed on the
Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS). The Tsunami obviously
was a setback to any preparations for a resumption of war by both sides.
Attention now focused on the disbursement of funds flowing in from abroad. The
Norwegians had facilitated the P-TOMS Agreement, which was once again
acknowledged as opening some space for the state and the LTTE to work together,
having been brought together by an unprecedented natural disaster. One of the
drawbacks of the above agreement was that the Muslims had been excluded from
this agreement. The Muslims in the east had been among the worst affected.
The failure of the above arrangement demonstrated
how deep rooted, animosity and suspicions were in the country. The JVP filed a
petition in the Supreme Court and a stay order was issued by the courts on some
provisions of the P-TOMS. The whole episode brought to the surface the
reluctance of powerful forces within Sinhalese society that rejected any
reforms in the direction of power sharing even at an administrative level,
leave alone through constitutional reforms.
The fact that the Tsunami could not bring the
divergent political leaders together demonstrated how divisive the country had
become not merely on the basis of ethnic identities but also through
adversarial politics among the Sinhalese themselves.
President Chandrika Kumaratunga and Prime Minister
Ranil Wickremasinghe, while expressing their concerns separately, were not able
to come together to act unitedly when a natural disaster of such proportions
hit the country. Victims belonged to all ethnic groups and political
affiliations, and often came from the poorer classes. Presidents Bush Sr. and
Clinton, who had fought a bitter election in 1992 in the USA
Violence ceased for a few months in the immediate
aftermath of the Tsunami only to re-emerge with a vengeance in the course of
time. Several high profile assassinations took place in 2005 and thereafter.
In November 2005 the presidential election took
place. Mahinda Rajapakse was the candidate of the UPFA. He formed a broad
alliance with the JHU and the JVP, both ultra-nationalists and hardliners on
the National Question. Rajapakse compromised on a fundamental principle that
now made a negotiated solution almost impossible. Until this point in time Sri
Lankan leaders affirmed their commitment to provide devolution within the
framework of a United Sri Lanka. The word federalism was discreetly avoided.
Now the JHU and JVP insisted that a solution be found within a Unitary Sri
Lanka. This was totally unacceptable to the Tamils.
The election was a hard fought one. For a hitherto
unexplained reason the LTTE ordered a boycott of the polls in territories under
its control and called upon the Tamils elsewhere not to vote. It was expected
that given a free choice most Tamils would have voted for the UNF candidate
Ranil Wickremasinghe. With the Sinhalese and Muslim vote evenly balanced in
seven provinces, the failure of the Tamils to vote in the North in particular
and in the east to some extent made it possible for Mahinda Rajapakse to win by
a small margin.
Drift to War
Sporadic acts of violence gradually led to all out
war. Technically the ceasefire was still on. But with the president committed
to a unitary constitution there ceased to be any hope whatsoever of a
negotiated solution. India
President Rajapakse announced the convening of an
All Parties Conference. Professor Tissa Vitharna, leader of the Lanka Sama
Samaja Party, a constituent member of the UPFA was appointed chairman. The LSSP
and the CP were committed to devolution. A broad based Experts Committee
consisting of seventeen members and reflecting divergent views was appointed to
study in depth and report on a constitutional settlement. The UNF and JVP
boycotted the APC proceedings. The TNA which represented the LTTE’s position
was not invited.
The LTTE ignored this whole exercise. Unable to
arrive at a consensus three separate reports were submitted. The majority
report was signed by eleven members and included all the Tamil and Muslim
members of the committee. This report received a favourable response among
concerned citizens from all communities. This was reflected in an open letter
to the eleven members by a cross section of academics and activists, who noted
that this report will go down as a historic document breaking new ground in the
country is path to peace. But the report was not acted upon. Instead the
government watered down the provisions of this report and placed it before the
APC.
The final report of the APC is still pending.
Meanwhile over a hundred concerned Tamil and Muslim
academics and activists within and outside the country signed a petition
calling upon the government to find a solution by desisting from using the word
Unitary.
References are made to these two interventions by
members of civil society to place in perspective that there was a considerable
body of opinion among Lankans within and outside the country rising above the
communal divide, consistently grappling with the issues of devolution and
sharing of power, while the larger and headlines grabbing conflict between the
state and the LTTE was on.
Numerous seminars and consultations were held by a
variety of high profile NGOs and civil society organisations, especially during
the ceasefire period. Several studies were published on issues of federalism
and devolution. These seminars attracted the participation of several
distinguished scholars, and activists among whom were one time high ranking
administrative and Foreign Service officers of the Government of India and
retired officers of the Indian Security Forces, some of whom had served with
the IPKF in Lanka. This was a new and welcome feature in the search for a just
peace. In the midst of the four phases of the long war and several attempts at
cessation of hostilities, ceasefire and peace talks, there was a parallel
process of discussions and debates taking place in the country. This was a sign
of hope and was in consonance with a long history of democratic processes and
representative government ushered in with the Donoughmore reforms in 1931,
seventeen years before independence. Some observers have remarked that in spite
of the unresolved National Question and the long war and its consequent
devastation in at least one-third of the country, civic institutions outside
the war zone were intact, though parliament itself had become devalued.
The challenge by 2006 was to preserve the integrity
of these civic institutions, the freedom of the press and to broaden the
democratic structure that assures full democracy, devolution and sharing of
power. This had to be acceptable to all communities, especially the
North-eastern Tamils, the Muslims and the Hill Country Tamils.
2006
to 2009 – The Final War
Much
is being written, discussed and will continue to be so for years to come on the
concluding stages of the war and the silencing of the guns that occurred on May 18 2009 .
Here we give a brief
summary of the main stages that led to the end of hostilities.
Events
leading to the final war and the end of fighting in May 2009 began in August
2006. Beginning in December 2005, there was increased guerrilla activity to the
northeast and clashes had occurred. The killings of well-known personalities
leaning towards the LTTE, indicated the emergence of a hard line against the
LTTE. These included Sivaram (Taraki) pro-LTTE journalist, senior TNA
parliamentarian from Batticaloa Joseph Pararajasingam and Raviraj the young and
popular TNA MP who was frequently on the channels of Sinhalese TV stations
participating in discussion programmes that drew the attention of an increasing
number of Sinhalese. His funeral was one of the biggest in Colombo
High
profile killings allegedly by the LTTE included Subathiran, a leading figure
from the EPRLF, Lakshman Kadirgamar, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kethis
Loganathan, an outstanding Tamil intellectual and peace activist, Jeyaraj
Fernandopulle, a senior minister in the government, and Maheswary Velayutham
long time Tamil woman activist who came into prominence in the 1980s when
she ran the Tamil Information Centre in Madurai. Resuming her legal practice in Colombo Jaffna Colombo
Mention
is made of the above to underline the terrible price Tamil society continued to
pay depriving it of leadership, at the hands of both the LTTE and anti-LTTE
Tamil para-military groups with or without backing by some elements in the
state.
In
addition wide scale kidnappings became commonplace. Tamil businessmen fled the
country for months. The ransom demanded ran into tens of millions of rupees.
What was particularly alarming was the kidnapping of men from the lower classes
who obviously had no funds at their disposal. The LTTE had a history of
kidnappings and ransom demands, but in the post 2006 period the kidnappings
were done by other players who were never identified or brought to book. A
climate of fear engulfed the country and that of the Tamils in particular. Some
were acts of extortion by nondescript criminal elements taking advantage of an
environment in which the law enforcement agencies looked the other way.
Meanwhile
attacks on civilian targets allegedly by the LTTE, including buses and trains
increased. In light of this violence, the co-chairs of the Donor conference
called on both parties to return to the negotiating table. The co-chairs, United States
In a
last-minute effort to salvage an agreement between the parties, the Norwegian
special envoy and the LTTE theoretician Anton Balasingam arrived in the island.
Both parties agreed that new talks could be held. At these both the government
and the LTTE agreed to curb the violence. On April 20, 2006 , the LTTE officially pulled out
of peace talks indefinitely.
Violence
continued to escalate. The LTTE launched a suicide assault on a naval convoy in
which 18 sailors died, The Allaipiddy massacre of May 2006 happened in which
13 Tamil civilians were
killed in separate incidents in three villages in Kayts in northern Lanka. An
attempted assassination was made against the commander of the Sri Lanka Army,
Lieutenant General Fonseka within the army headquarters in the capital. Defence
Secretary Gotabaya Rajapakse, brother of President Rajapakse also narrowly
escaped an attempted assassination. These events naturally led to a hardening
of attitudes.
Soon after an
unsuccessful attack against a naval vessel carrying 710 unarmed security force
personnel on holiday, (Delete), the European Union decided to proscribe the
LTTE as a terrorist organisation in May, 2006.
This resulted in the freezing of LTTE assets in the member nations of the EU,
crippling its efforts to raise funds. In a statement, the European Parliament said that the LTTE
did not represent all the Tamils and called on it to "allow for political
pluralism and alternate democratic voices in the northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka
For the
first time since the 2001 ceasefire, the Sri Lanka Air Force carried out aerial
assaults on rebel positions in the north-eastern part of the island nation in
retaliation for the attack. In June, 2006 the LTTE attacked a bus killing at
least 64 Sinhalese civilians and prompting more air strikes by the Air Force.
Meanwhile the assassination of Sri
Lanka
Mavil Aru Water
Dispute
A major
development leading to the first large-scale fighting since signing of the
ceasefire occurred when the LTTE closed the Mavil Aru sluice gates supplying
water to villages in government controlled areas. After initial negotiations
and efforts by the SLMM to open the gates failed, the Air Force attacked LTTE
positions and ground troops began an operation to open the gate.
The
sluice gates were eventually reopened with conflicting reports as to who
actually opened them. A government spokesman said that "utilities could
not be used as bargaining tools".
The security forces launched fresh attacks on LTTE positions around the reservoir.
This confrontation marked the beginning of the final phase of the war.
Without
going into the pros and cons of the Mavil Aru crisis wherein allegations and
counter allegations were made suffice it to say that following heavy fighting
with the LTTE, government troops soon gained full control of the Mavil Aru
reservoir.
Fighting
escalated in adjoining territories in the Trincomalee district of the Eastern Province Muttur
These
murders evoked widespread international condemnation. The Air Force carried out
an air strike against a facility in the rebel held Mullaitivu area, The
Chencholai air strike resulted in the killing of several. The LTTE claimed that
the facility was an orphanage and that the victims were school girls attending
a course on first aid. The government alleged that this was an LTTE training
facility and that the children were child soldiers.
In a
queer and unprecedented event a convoy carrying the High Commissioner for Pakistan to Sri Lanka India Pakistan
Fall of Sampur
Since
the resumption of violence, concerns were mounting among the military establishment
that the strategically crucial Sri Lanka Navy base in Trinconmalee was under
grave threat from LTTE gun positions located in and around Sampur, which lies
across the Bay from Trincomalee. Following the clashes in Mavil Aru and Muttur,
the LTTE had intensified attacks targeting the naval base in Trincomalee. The
Lankan military launched an assault to retake the LTTE camps in Sampur and the
adjoining areas. LTTE admitted defeat and stated their cadres made a strategic
withdrawal this important town.
Just
days later, a suspected solitary LTTE suicide bomber in Habarana, in the centre
of the country killed about 100 sailors who were returning home on leave. It
was the deadliest suicide attack in the history of the conflict.
Two days
later, LTTE Sea Tiger cadres launched an attack against a naval base in the
southern port city of Galle
Despite
these incidents, both parties agreed to unconditionally attend peace talks in Geneva Jaffna
In
December 2006, the Commander of the Army and other senior government officials
expressed their plans to initially drive the LTTE out of the East, and then use
the full strength of the military to defeat the LTTE in the North of the
country. Subsequently, the Army began an offensive against the LTTE in the
Batticaloa district with the objective of taking the principal stronghold of
the LTTE in the East
Over the
next few weeks, an estimated 20,000 civilians fled from Vakarai to Government
controlled areas fearing the imminent assault. The Army launched a new
offensive, and Vakarai fell to the advancing troops in January 2007. The loss
of Vakarai cut off supply routes of the northern Tigers to their cadres in the
East, thus weakening the Tigers' already diminishing grip on the East.
Special
Forces and Commando units began a new operation in February to clear the last
remaining LTTE cadres from the Eastern
Province
Final Battles in the North
The
largest piece of territory the LTTE controlled was in the Northern Province Jaffna Colombo Jaffna Colombo
by air, which was expensive, or by boat to Trincomalee and then by train or
buses to Colombo
Early in
2008 the army began to gradually attack frontline defences of the LTTE in the
Mannar district, while pressure was exercised on all fronts. This time the LTTE
confronted a determined army, superior in numbers and powerful weapons. Air
strikes were frequent. The air force admitted at the end of hostilities that
they had carried out three thousand sorties in this phase of the war. By
May-November 2008 the armed forces gained control of the north-western coast,
severely weakening LTTE supply lines by sea and any links it may have had with South India . Late 2008 witnessed the fall of the vital
gateway to the Jaffna peninsula when Poonery and
eventually Elephant
Pass Jaffna
Mercifully
civilian casualties were minimal throughout 2008. The LTTE had ordered
civilians to move east of the A9 highway. Tens of thousands moved further and
further to the East until they were finally trapped between the sea and a small
strip of land that constituted the final bastion of the LTTE in
Puthukudiyiruppu. They left behind all their possessions. How much in terms of
property movable and immovable was lost is unknown. A study of the losses would
be revealing. But the primary concern turned to saving lives. No one seemed to
know the exact number of civilians trapped. It is now known that the figure was
close upon 300,000. Government administrators who had worked in these areas
should have known but for obvious reasons they remained silent.
Then in
late January Mullaitivu town regarded, as the military headquarters of the LTTE
was captured, At this point international pressure mounted calling upon both
the GoSL and the LTTE to declare a ceasefire and resume talks. The GoSL
categorically refused calling upon the LTTE to lay down arms, before any talks
resumed. The LTTE going by its past history refused to lay down arms. The GoSL
smelling final victory even though it would be at tremendous cost in casualties
was in no mood to accept anything short of surrender.
The army
declared a no fire zone in the region. Initially civilians were inhibited from
moving out. But by mid-February what began as a trickle eventually led to
thousands fleeing LTTE held territory. By April nearly 200,000 had moved into
government-controlled territory. The war yet to be over attention shifted to
the welfare and future of the IDPs now detained in army controlled camps. As
the territory under LTTE control diminished, there was a lull of a few weeks
and deep concern was expressed locally as well as internationally about those
still trapped in the war zone. It was generally believed that no major
offensive would take place until the results of the Indian elections were
announced on 16 May 2009 .
Within two days the trapped civilians probably realized that it was all over
and came out by the tens of thousands totalling some seventy thousand. The true
figures with regard to civilian deaths, is now a highly controversial issue
contributing towards a great deal of bitterness among the Tamils. Will the
truth come out someday? How many of the LTTE cadres laid down their lives in
the 2008 to 2009 fight to the end are facts that have not been revealed to
date. The state has admitted that over six thousand members of the security
forces lost their lives and that 29,000 were injured in this final phase of
this war. The credibility of the state on such matters has always been low on
these matters throughout the twenty-five years of war. Understandable at times
and expected at times of war, but someday the people of this country are
entitled to the full facts from both sides.
The
full story of what happened in the last three years, especially the war in the
north will someday have to be told, free from propagandist embellishments and
twisting of facts. Tamil public opinion has not yet come to terms with the
losses incurred. It was without doubt a tragic end with whole of the LTTE
leadership wiped out including its second rung and third rung leaders as
revealed by the media. This marked the end of an era. Where the country goes
from here is the challenge that has to be faced.
But
one must say categorically that though the guns have gone silent, the
root causes that led to this ruthless war remain. How the state conducts itself
and the path that what is left of Tamil democratic leadership will take is now
a matter for a great deal of concern and speculation.
The Challenges Ahead
The
defeat of the LTTE, the consequent plight of the Tamils and the response of the
state will without doubt be the subject of analysis and discussion for years to
come. Needless to say the primary responsibility at this critical juncture lies
with the state and Sinhalese political leadership to initiate constitutional
reforms that will satisfy the Tamils, the Muslims and other minorities in the
country. The immediate priority is the welfare and settlement of the nearly
three hundred thousand displaced persons held in state controlled camps. How
they are treated will be the test case by which the state will be judged, and
will pave the way for a durable settlement.
In the
writers view a return to normalcy must be given as much importance if not more
importance than a political solution. The holding of Municipal Council and
Provincial Council elections will be meaningless without a return to normalcy.
And this must be done expeditiously. Normalcy will require the free movement of
the people residing in the North and East and easy access to these areas by
people in the rest of the country. This includes Vavuniya, Mannar and Jaffna Jaffna Jaffna be allowed to travel freely
out of Jaffna Jaffna Jaffna
Need for Self-Criticism
Having
raised the above concerns in this concluding section an attempt is made briefly
deal with some critical issues. Enough has been said about the failure of
Sinhalese political parties and their leadership. Here is an attempt to assess
what went wrong with the Tamil struggle that drew global attention. It is
important that the fundamental errors committed are not repeated again. This
calls for some self-criticism. There is a tendency among Tamils to accuse
anyone who calls for self-criticism as anti-Tamil and playing into the hands of
Sinhalese extremists. This mental make-up must go. The predicament in which the
Tamils are at the president juncture calls for a great deal of study and
analysis among the Tamils as a people in the perspective of what happened in
the last few decades.
One
recalls how Tamil supporters of the left movement demanded that the left
parties, the LSSP and CP, do self-criticism after the reversal of their
principled politics from 1935 to 1964, and notably after their collaboration
with the United Front government of 1970 to 1977, including the enactment of
the 1972 constitution. During this period the seeds for secession were sowed.
The left to some extent did so and today what remains of the left in the post
1977 period, whether in alliance with the government or in opposition to the
government, are all firmly committed to devolution. Therein lay some hope.
The LTTE
like its predecessor the TULF got trapped in its secessionist demand. This was
a geo-political impossibility given India
The FP
and the TULF participated in negotiations from a position of weakness backed
only by the number of seats they held in parliament and widespread electoral
support among the Tamil people. At times they were pushed to backdoor
negotiations, while in public they indulged in the rhetoric of liberation
bordering on the demagogic. There is one view that the TULF put forward the
secessionist demand for purposes of leverage. At least that is what they
attempted to do in practice until 1999. Having made the supreme blunder in
making the secessionist demand in 1976, the TULF never officially withdrew the
demand. Nevertheless, they were branded
traitors and several paid for this with their lives.
The LTTE
having effectively taken control of substantial chunks of territory through the
force of arms could have negotiated from a position of strength on substantive
issues leading to devolution and autonomy. Unfortunately their leadership, or
rather their leader, did not have the capacity for compromise. This required
stepping down from the impossible secessionist demand and getting the maximum
possible, short of a sovereign state. Part of the blame falls on articulate
sections of admirers and supporters of the LTTE leader, especially
professionals and academics in the Tamil Diaspora, who perceived virtue in this
stubborn uncompromising position.
There
were several precedents in armed struggles globally such as that in Northern Ireland , Aceh in Indonesia , and the Maoists in Nepal
The LTTE
and its supporters were carried away by the self-righteousness of their demand
without realizing that there are limits to armed struggle. World history
testifies to the fact that what is perceived as morally right is more often
than not politically unrealizable. They failed to place politics in command.
There was in reality no political wing, in what was a purely militarist
organisation. What passed off for a political wing was in effect a public
relations centre, and the peace secretariat a propaganda unit. The same can be
said of the peace secretariat on the side of the state in the last three years
under the present regime.
Excessive
violence targeting civilians led to the proscription of the LTTE in several
states. These were branded as acts of “terrorism” by the Sri Lankan State,
repeated ad nauseam by the state controlled and other sections of the
media. The whole concept of the ill-defined term “terrorism” and the indiscriminate
use of this term was part of the problem, taking into account the sufferings
heaped on the Tamil people who were victims of excessive violence.
There
was in these years of war, a great deal of international sympathy for the
plight of the Tamil people and their legitimate aspirations for the highest
degree of autonomy possible within a united Lanka. There was at the same time a
great deal of goodwill towards the Sinhalese people and all other minorities in
this country. The international community was for a negotiated settlement. The
writer participating in numerous conferences and meetings in India , Japan
In
declaring itself the sole representatives and ruthlessly destroying all dissent
among the Tamils, the LTTE in some ways paved the way for its defeat. It is
difficult to assess the degree of support the LTTE actually enjoyed among the
Tamil people in the country at any particular juncture. A UTHR report in the
1990s referred to the Tamils as a “trapped people”. The attitude of the average
Tamil was conditioned by whose victim he or she had been. The loyalties of the
people were conditioned by the objective situation prevalent at a particular
time. The further one was away from the war zone the more pro-LTTE he or she
became. It was therefore not surprising that the ardent and most passionate
supporters of the LTTE and its Tamil Eelam demand were in Europe, UK , USA ,
Canada and Australia
But most
Tamils shared partially the political aspirations of the LTTE that is the
demand for a degree of self-rule in their homeland. They did not necessarily
approve of the methods adopted by the leadership of the LTTE and its one party
authoritarian state. This, the Sinhalese leaders never understood or simply
refused to come to terms with. There was no way in which most of the Tami people
could have distanced themselves or confronted the LTTE, as long as there
remained the unresolved problem of the national question, autonomy and equal
rights.
The
prolonged war and the consequent loss of lives and property could have been
avoided if the leaders of the Sri Lankan State and leading political parties
had adopted constitutional reforms that were acceptable to the Tamils, the 2000
constitution being the closest that any government came to. Given goodwill,
sincere and principled implementation, support for the LTTE would have
evaporated over a period of time. In short a degree of autonomy with good
governance and guarantee of democratic rights would have solved the problem
long ago. Sad to say Sinhalese leadership did not have the statesmanship for
such a commitment.
Change and Continuity in Tamil Politics
The
Jaffna Youth Congress committed to full independence and a united Ceylon had led a boycott of the 1931 elections
in Jaffna Jaffna
In 1934
when elections were held again G. G. Ponnambalam defeated the Hon. K. Balasingam,
the outstanding Tamil statesman who had identified himself with the JYC. Ponnambalam went on to found the Tamil
Congress in the 1940s and dominated Tamil politics until 1956. His main demand
was for balanced representation, rejected by the Sinhalese. He finally accepted
cabinet office. Thereafter the leadership passed to S. J. V. Chelvanayakam in
1956. He had broken away from the TC and founded the Federal Party in 1949.
This rift initiated a period of long and bitter rivalry and divisive politics
wherein the adherents of the TC and the FP murdered each other with words. The
personality cult was nurtured. Leaders were obsessed with the Thani Perum
Thalaivar (single great leader) title consciously developed or thrust on
them by their followers. The LTTE and other Tamil armed organization followed
this practice and evoking fear. The leader could not be challenged. One did
this at the at the risk of being branded traitor and physically eliminated.
Internal democracy, with the exception of the FP, was rarely practiced. This
was true of the dominant Sinhalese parties as well, where dynastic tendencies
took root. Fortunately the Tamils were spared dynastic politics.
The two
leaders finally in the twilight of their lives came together to form the Tamil
United Front, later renamed the Tamil United Liberation Front. This unity was
too late. The years from 1949 to 1976 were wasted years in Tamil politics, when
Tamil leadership did not speak with one voice, trapped in the politics of
parliamentarianism. By 1977 both leaders had died and the leadership passed to
Amirthalingam and Sivasithamparam. Events moved fast and by 1980 Tamil youth
militancy had emerged. Soon power and Pirapakaran and the LTTE consolidated
power and leadership.
It is
noteworthy that Tamil leadership has changed more or less every twenty-five
years from 1934, with some years constituting a transitional phase, a
twenty-five year syndrome. But there was an element of continuity, in seeking
constitutional safeguards. Sinhalese critics have labelled these exclusive
Tamil parties as “communalist” or extremists and more recently as separatists.
A large number of Tamils however have perceived these changes as phases in the
growth of Tamil nationalism and identity politics.
No doubt
they were exclusively Tamil based, though brief attempts made by the FP to
incorporate the Muslims never succeeded. Nor were solid links made with the
Hill Country Tamils (Malayaha Thamilar), the plantation workers in
particular. The Jaffna
Tamil
spokespersons were obsessed with a purely Tamil struggle and this was clearly
visible in the three phases of leadership indicated above. Amirthalingam,
leader of the TULF, expressed this mindset at a public meeting in Jaffna to protest the days of arson and burning of the Jaffna
Speaking
in Tamil and having thanked the friends from the south, Amirthalingan quoted a
Tamil proverb to drive home his point, “Aluthalum pillai avale peravendum”,
which in translation reads “though she weeps a mother must give birth to her
own child.” In saying this he conveyed the oft-repeated message that “the
struggle is ultimately ours and it is only we as Tamils who can win our
liberation.”
Problems of Method and Leadership
In the
context of the above line of thinking prevalent from 1934, Karalasingam, a
distinguished theoretician of the left placed before the Tamil people a valid
critique on problems of method and leadership of the Tamils He was a Tamil by
birth, but had a strong Ceylonese identity and was an internationalist in the
best traditions of the left of that era. Contesting Chelvanayakam, the highly
respected and popular leader of the Federal Party, and addressing all his
meetings in English having lived abroad for the greater part of his life, he
polled a substantial vote in the 1960 elections. The fashionable thing in
politics then as today was to don the national dress and speak in Tamil or
Sinhalese to establish ones ‘national’ identity and loyalty.
In his
chapter titled, “Why have they failed” from his book “The Way Out for the
Tamil-speaking People” in its second and revised edition in 1978 he had this to
say:
It is
worthy to note that all the parties that have hitherto gained the confidence of
the Tamil people have done so on the basis of resisting the chauvinism of the
majority community and securing for their people their legitimate demands. But
the period of the ascendancy of the Tamil Congress and that of the FP has
signified to the Tamil people not an increase but a diminution – indeed a sharp
and precipitous decline of their fortunes. What heightens their tragedy is that
their present plight cannot be attributed either to their apathy or their lack
of support to the parties, which at different times spoke for them. Apathy
there never was on the question of minority rights. If anything, politics for
the last thirty years in the northern and eastern provinces has evolved round
precisely this question, to the exclusion of all others. The popular support
for the traditional Tamil parties has been so enthusiastic and overwhelming as
to incur the envy and jealousy of their rivals.
We have
come against a strange paradox. The Tamil-speaking people have been led in the
last decade by an apparently resolute leadership guided by the best intentions
receiving not merely, the widest support of the people but also their
enthusiastic cooperation and yet the Tamil speaking people find themselves at
the lowest ebb in their history. In spite of all their efforts people have
suffered one defeat after another, one humiliation after another. How is one to
explain the yawning gulf between the strivings of the people and the virtually
hopeless impasse in which they find themselves?
The
fundamental flaw in the political strategy of the FP is their conception that
the fight for the rights of the Tamil speaking people is the responsibility
solely of the Tamil-speaking people themselves and that only the Tamils who can
wage this fight and that they must do this as Tamils. Therefore it is necessary
for the Tamils to build their own exclusive organizations to lead the Tamil
people in their fight.
It is
high time that the Tamil speaking people paid attention to the problems of method
and leadership of their struggle as these are fast becoming the key questions
…the present leadership because of its close identification with the past will
not encourage any discussion of these fundamental questions – it would rather
see the Tamil speaking people burn themselves out in impotent rage and despair
against the government than permit a critical examination of its politics.
At a seminar in Colombo
“Karalasingam’s
critique of Tamil political leadership from TC to FP to TULF has proved to be
prophetic. Not only have they led the Tamil people into the present
predicament, but created the conditions that destroyed them leaving it to
another generation to help the Tamil speaking peoples to burn themselves out.” (14)
Karalasingam
might have as well written the above piece in 2009. Burn themselves out they
did in 2009, with unprecedented civilian deaths and casualties, while the world
stood by and watched without a single state in the international arena to come
to their help. Problems of method and leadership will take centre stage again,
and it is hoped Tamil political leadership will never again commit the errors
of the past.
Take Nation and
Nationalism off the Discourse
Too much
blood has been shed, and too many people have died in the name of nation
and nationalism. It is time that ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’ be taken off the
discourse. We have witnessed in the last three decades the evil side of Janus
faced nationalism. In the Tamil language there is no appropriate word for
nation and nationalism. The words used connote race and country. This is
possibly the same in the Sinhalese language and other Asian languages as well.
In Japanese the word ‘minzoku’ is used which actually means tribe. No
wonder then that the Japanese have problems in understanding and relating to
such problems.
There is
far too much of an obsession with narrow national sentiment as demonstrated by
waving of flags. This has now reached epidemic proportions at cricket matches,
the Olympics and other sports events. In Europe
after its centuries of warfare this kind of behaviour is somewhat muted. The USA however is a pretty bad model with their
additional “God Bless America America Japan
In the
year 2000, the Asian Regional Exchange for New Alternatives held a major
seminar in Colombo East
Asia .
National
sovereignty, national security and integrity, must give way to Human
sovereignty, human security and integrity. Unresolved inter-state relations,
often grounded on ethnic, linguistic and religious identities, have soured
relationships among peoples in the region for six decades after decolonisation.
Several of these states have unresolved problems of minorities and communities
within their respective states.
The
conflict has often been interpreted and reported as a Sinhalese- Tamil
conflict, implying conflict between the people of the two-communities/
nationalities. This is an unfair judgment on the people of Lanka, be they
Sinhalese, Tamils or Muslims, who in many parts of the country have co-existed,
not without tensions and problems but with a great deal of harmony. In its
essence what we have witnessed was a struggle for power. The two dominant
political parties in the Sinhalese south used the Tamil issue to ride to power.
Among the Tamils the LTTE by the 1990s was more concerned about its exclusive
monopoly of power rather than the human security of the Tamil people.
In its
essence the conflict and the subsequent war were not necessarily between the
Sinhalese people and the Tamil people. This distinction is vital. On both sides
leaders played on the fears of the people, and used their genuine aspirations
for democratic rights and an egalitarian society in a most opportunistic way.
Unscrupulous politicians and some journalists gave this a chauvinist twist and
turned them against each other. In fact the vast majority of both Sinhalese and
Tamils had little to gain in improving their quality of life in socio-economic
terms from this conflict. Defence expenditure from, being well below one
percent of GDP in the I970s kept going up and up over the last three decades,
today exceeding the combined expenditure on education and health care.
At the
height of the anti-Tamil pogroms of 1958, 1977 and 1983 several Sinhalese
families provided safety and refuge to Tamils. On the other hand it is also
true that many did not attempt to help or simply ignored what happened. This
kind of behaviour was not surprising taking into account an educational system
that perpetuated myths and bred anti-Tamil prejudices. In addition the news
media was manipulated in such a way that Sinhalese people were never told the
true story of what was happening in the country, especially in the Tamil areas.
They were never told, for instance, that until 1982 politically motivated
Tamils had (killed not) not killed a single Sinhalese civilian in Jaffna 1981. In this context it
is worth noting that in 1958, 1977 and 1983 people resident in their immediate
neighbourhood rarely attacked Tamils. Most of the attacks came from
well-organized thugs and mobs brought from distant places to attack Tamil
homes. The propaganda war that the government launched against the Tamils
distorted the perceptions of many Sinhalese who were made to see a “terrorist”
in most Tamils. Anti-Tamil riots have never been spontaneous, but were
well-organized pogroms by powerful politicians.
Another
point often overlooked is that the Sinhalese are a minority in the region
taking into account the existence of sixty million Tamils in South India and
substantial Tamil minority communities in Malaysia
and Singapore Australia
A proper
appreciation of the history and cultural achievements of the Sinhalese people and
vice versa has yet to take place among the peoples of Lanka. Nor have there
been political educators of the stature of a Nehru who stressed concepts of
unity in diversity. His legacies helped achieve this to a substantial extend in
India India
Social
education of both the Sinhalese and Tamils for a pluralistic multi-ethnic
society is a challenge that leaders on both sides have to face. This is the age
of the information revolution. These resources can be used for demonic purposes
to manipulate, prejudice and promote conflict, or for positive and constructive
purposes that assure peaceful relations on the basis of justice, human and
democratic rights and mutual appreciation and understanding of cultures,
languages and religions.
Ideally
there should be a Truth and Reconciliation commission. But then there is
neither a Nelson Mandela nor a Desmond Tutu in this country. It is the task of
Sinhalese Buddhist society to throw up such leaders, to which hopefully the
Tamils will respond. Reconciliation and restoration of peaceful relations are
difficult challenges that have to be met. This has to begin with education and
shaping public opinion. Time magazine several years ago carried an opinion
column titled “Forgiveness to the Injured Doth Belong”.
Equality
and Dignity
One may
therefore conclude with this quote from the first lengthy report to be released
after May 2009. It comes appropriately
from the reputed University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna
In his
speech, the President thought it a brilliant stroke to abolish the word
‘minority’ from the vocabulary and make everyone equal, as if all it took were a
royal proclamation. Along with this he recognized only two kinds of people,
those who love their motherland and those who do not, the latter being the
lesser. The problem with that, of course is whose idea of a motherland
prevails? These sentiments in the speech reflect those who hold to the
Sinhalese-Buddhist hegemonic view. This hegemonic rhetoric about motherland
accompanied by anti-Tamil violence led to its Tamil version, which at that
historical juncture most Tamils believed was forced on them. Thousands of Tamil
youth fought in several groups and willingly gave their life, not because they
did not love their country fervently, but because they believed their country
was Tamil Eelam. They include the majority of LTTE cadres who have died.
Even if one rejects the LTTE leadership as totalitarian, barbaric and utterly self-indulgent, one cannot dismiss the cadres both in the LTTE and from other groups as “terrorists” and traitors against Lanka. The lesson for those of us living is that however much it took hold of us at that time; nationalist rhetoric contained within it the seeds of war, a terrible waste of lives and totalitarianism. We must honour the dead, both militants and soldiers, with a heavy sense of responsibility. In order that the honour we give them are no mere empty words, we have to feel where we all went wrong and do what is needful to prevent a repetition.
The only way those Tamil families and communities that have lost loved ones can find meaning in their loss and begin to think about a future as part of Lanka is if they as a people are granted equality and dignity through a just political process. Making them feel Lankan will be hard work… (15)
Appendix
Population
1990 (estimated) 17, 200,000
Population
1981 (census) 14,850,001
Linguistic (Ethnic) Population in 1981
Sinhalese 10,985,666 (73.98%)
Tamils 2,696,768 (18.16%)
Moors
(Muslims) 1,056,972 ( 7.12%)
Malays
(Muslims) 43,378 ( 0.29%)
Burghers
38,236 ( 0.26%)
Tamil-speaking peoples
Hill
Country (INDIAN descent 825,233 ( 5.56%)
Moors 1,056,972 ( 7.12%)
Ceylon Tamils (or Lankan Tamils) live
mostly in the Northern and Eastern
Provinces South India
most of whom are workers in the tea plantations located in the central
highlands. Though in the 1981 census they numbered 825,233 or 5.6 per cent, in
1969-70 they accounted for 1,162,300 persons constituting 9.4% of the total
population. The reduction in their numbers is due to the repatriation of large
numbers to India
Under the Indo-Ceylon Pacts of 1964
and 1974 it was agreed that Ceylon
would repatriate to India
Muslim leaders and political parties
have always accepted office under either of the two main governing parties the
UNP and the SLFP.
Religions
Buddhists 10,292,686 (69.31%)
Hindus 2,295,858 (15.46%)
Muslims 1,134,556 ( 7.64%)
Christians 1,111,736 (
7.49%)
Others 15,265 ( 0.10%)
Demographic data relating to ethnicity
Table 1. Northern and Eastern Province
Year All races Sinhalese % Tamils
% Moors
%
1921 567,650 12,539 2.2 460,0520 81.0 89,087 15.7
1946 758,684 33,058 4.4
596,017 78.6 127,207
16.8 1953 925,060 60,692 6.6 699,297 75.6 158,555 17.1
1963
1,288,040 129,960
10.1 935,590 72.6 216,510 16.8
1971
1,592,200 174,419
11.0 1,124,660 70.6 287,132 18.0
1981
2,087,943 276,507 13.2
1,432,679 68.6 376,839 17.6
Table II. Eastern Province
Year All races Sinhalese % Tamils
% Moors %
1921 192,821 8,744
4.5 103,251 53.5 75,992 39.4
1946 279,112 23,456 8.4 146,059 52.3 109,024 39.1
1953 354,410 46,470 13.1 167,898 47.3 135,322 38.1
1963 546,130 1,09,690 20.1 246,120 45.1 185,750 34.0
1971 717,571 148,572 20.7 315,560 43.9 248,567 34.6
1981 976,475 243,358 24.9 409,451 41.9 315,201 32.2
Table III. Tricomalee District – Population
by ethnic groups
Year All races Sinhalese % Tamils % Moors %
1827 19158 250 1.3 15663 81.8 3245 16.9
1881 22197 935 4.2 14394 64.8 5746 25.9
1891 25745 1109 4.3 17117 66.4 6426 25.0
1901 28441 1203 4.2 17069 60.0 8258 29.0
1911 29755 1138 3.8 17233 57.9 9714 32.6
1921 34112 1501 4.4 18586 54.5 12846 37.7
1946 75926 11606 15.3 33795 44.5 23219 30.6
1953 83917 15296 18.2 37517 44.7 28616 34.1
1963
138220 40950 29.6 54050 39.1 42560 30.8
1971
188245 54744 29.1 71749 38.1 59924 31.8
1981
256790 86341 33.6 93510 36.4 74403 29.0
*The
mother tongue of all Moors is Tamil
Source:
Department of Census and Statistics ,
Sri Lanka
Table
IV. Population – Tamils of Indian Origin in Sri Lanka 1911-1981
Provinces
Year Western
Sabrag North Central Ulva North
Northern Eastern Southern
Total
Amuwa
Western Central Island
1911 81075 83332
16832 265911 69873
2953 2970 886
7150 530983
1921 91293 98093
23730 283771 82562
4555 4478 1371
12656 602510
1946 90604 122856 13289
395728 127164 3097
8708
4565 14578 780589
1953 106690 145335 17084
489147 166265 3378
17907 5307 22985
974098
1963 97920 170500 18220
560430 210710 1910
28150 6940 29070
1122850
1971 99635 174875
20013 573491 217991
4149 52374 17433 35407
1195368 1981 60746 132308 9391
376055 144959
990 63431 12045 25308 825233 
Table V. Population – persons
of Indian Origin 1911-1981
(Estate population and working
population)
Year Total Total (2) as Total pop. (4)as No. of Indian % of Indian
Sri Lanka Indian a %
of Indians a % workers on Indian workers
Population Population
of (1) on estates of (2)
estates on estates
(1) (2)
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1911 4106350 529712 12.9
457765 86.2 - -
1921 4497854 602510 13.4
493944 82.0
- -
1946 6657339 780589 117
665853 85.3
- -
1953 8097896 974098
12.0 815000 83.6 580883 71.3
1963 10590060 1122850 10.8
932090 82.5 571852 61.4
1971 12711143 1174606 9.2
951785 81.9
523176 66.0
1981 14850001 025233
6.6 666000 80.7 388000 55.0
Source:
Economic Review, March 1980, People’s Bank, Reports on Census of Population,
Department of Census and Statistics
*Estimate
Note: The
term “Indian origin” refers to persons of recent Indian origin
The
tables are reproduced from “The Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka Economic Assets by
T. Valluvan, Tamil Information Centre, London
NOTES
(1) The first part
of this article is adapted from three previous publications by the author for
the period covered until 1997, published in 1989, 1991 and an unpublished
manuscript presented at a symposium in Tokyo
(2) Soulbury Constitution:
named after Lord Soulbury who was chairman of the Special Commission sent in
1944 by the British Government to report on Constitutional Reforms introduced
the parliamentary system and responsible government with substantial reserve
powers retained by the Governor. With the grant of independence in 1948 the
same Constitution was retained, with a mere revocation of the reserve powers of
the Governor and the Colonial Secretary. A Constituent Assembly was not called
to draft a constitution for independent Ceylon
(3) Benedict
Anderson, Imagined Communities:
Reflections on the Origin and Spread 0f
Nationalism, Verso, London
(4) Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi, (Federal Party)
Silver Jubilee Volume, Jaffna
(5) A.
Aniirthalingani, Sri Lanka Leader of
the Opposition Analyses the New Constitution, (Text of Speech delivered in
the National State Assembly on 3rd August. 1978). Booklet published
in Jaffna
(6) Kumar David, “Roots
and Results of Racism in Sri
Lanka Hong Kong . 1989. P.233
(7) Rajesh Kandian.
India’s Sri Lanka fiasco: Peace
Keepers at War, Vision Books, New
Delhi
(8) Major Shankar
Bhaduri and Major General Afsir Karim with Lieutenant General Mathew Thomas
(ed), The Sri Lankan Crisis
(Lancer paper I), Lancer International, New Delhi. 1990, pp.95, 96, 51& 52.
(9) Tisaranee
Gunasekera, Rampant Rulers,
Sunday Island March 22, 2009
(10)
Sumanasiri Liyanage, ‘One Step at a Time’: Reflections on the Peace Process
in Sri Lanka 2001-2005, South Asia Peace Institute, Colombo
(11) Jayadeva
Uyangoda, in Sumanasiri Liyanage op.cit.
p 132-133.
(12) Dayan
Jayatileke, in Sumanasiri Liyanage
op.cit. p 134.
(13). We are like
Jews, says LTTE’s suicide bomber.
Rediff.com/news/2009/feb/22colombo-ltte-tells…citing
Tamil net and puthinam.com.
(14) V.
Karalasingam, The Way out for the Tamil-speaking People” quoted in Santasilan
Kadirgamar, “The Left Tradition in Lankan Tamil Politics”, in Sri Lanka:
Global Challenges and National Crises: Proceedings of the Hector Abhayavardhana
Felicitation Symposium. Edited by Rajan Philips. Ecumenical Institute for
Study and Dialogue and Social Scientists’ Association, Colombo 2001
(15) UTHR(J) report titled, ‘A Marred Victory and a Defeat Pregnant with
Foreboding’. The report can be found at: http://www.uthr.org/SpecialReports/spreport32.htm
Abbreviations with
brief explanations
B – C Pact Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam
Pact
C. P. Communist Party of Sri
Lanka (was pro-Moscow)
C. W. C. Ceylon Workers’ Congress
(party of the Tamil Plantation
Workers
led by Mr. Thondaman.)
E. P. R. L. F Eelam People’s Revolutionary
Liberation Front
EROS Eelam Revolutionary
Organization
F. P. Federal Party (known in
Tamil as the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi)
GoSL Government of Sri Lanka
l. P. K. F. Indian Peace Keeping Forces
J. V. P. Janatha Vimukthi
Peramuna (Peoples Liberation Front)
L.
S. S. P. Lanka Sama Samaja
Party (Lanka Equal Society Party) oldest political party founded I935,
historically Trotsykist and anti-Stalinist)
L. T. T. E. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
P. L. O. T. E. Peoples Liberation Organization of
Tamil Eelam
S.
L. F. P. Sri Lanka Freedom
Party (founded by Mr. Bandaranaike in 1951, subsequently led by Mrs.
Bandaranaike and then by daughter Chandrika Kumaratunge. Presently led by
Mahinda Rajapakse
T. C. Tamil Congress
T. E. L. O. Tamil Eelam Liberation
Organization
T. U. L. F. Tamil United Liberation Front
UNF United National Front
(main constituent was the UNP)
U. N. P. United National Party (founded
in 1947)
Select Bibliography
Asanka Welikala, A
State of Permanent Crisis: Constitutional
Government, Fundamental Rights and States of Emergency in Sri Lanka
Indo-Sri Lanka
Accord, 29 July 1987, Comments, Reflections … Logos Volume 26
Nos, 2, 3 & 4, December 1987, Centre for Society and Religion, Colombo,
1988
John Gooneratne, Negotiating
with the Tigers (LTTE) – (2002-2005) A View from the Second Row. Stamford Lake
(Pvt) Ltd, Colombo
Kumar Rupesinghe
(ed), Negotiating Peace in Sri
Lanka London , UK
Kumar Rupesinghe
(ed), Negotiating Peace in Sri Lanka :
Efforts, Failures & Lessons, Volume One, 2nd Edition,
Foundation for Co-existence, Colombo
Kumar Rupesinghe
(ed), Negotiating Peace in Sri Lanka :
Efforts, Failures & Lessons, Volume Two, Foundation for Co-existence, Colombo
Michael Roberts, Burden
of History: Obstacles to Power Sharing in Sri
Lanka , A History of Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka
Michael Roberts, Primordialist
Strands in Contemporary Sinhala Nationalism in Sri
Lanka : Urumaya as Ur , A
History of Ethnic Conflict in Sri
Lanka
Rajan Hoole , Sri
Lanka Jaffna ),
Wasala Publications, Colombo
Reports of the University Teachers for
Human Rights, (Jaffna
Santasilan Kadirgamar, “Lanka: Nationalism, Self-determination and
Conflict”, in Ethnicity: Identity Conflict and Crisis, (ed) Kumar David
and Santasilan Kadirgamar Arena Press. Hong Kong .
1989.
Santasilan
Kadirgamar. “A Sovereign Will to Self-Destruct.” Paper presented at the
International Symposium on Human Security in Asia Pacific Region, 21-23
December 1997, Peace Research Institute of Meiji Gakuin University, Tokyo
Santasilan Kadirgamar.
“Ethnicity, Discrimination and Conflict in Sri Lanka Wako University ,
Machida-shi, Tokyo , Japan
Shelton U Kodikara
(ed), Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement of July 1987, A Publication of the International Relations Programme,
University of Colombo, Sridev Printers, Dehiwela, Sri Lanka. 1989
Sumanasiri
Liyanage & M.Sinnathamby (ed), A Glimmer of Hope: A New Phase in the
Constitutional Reforms of Sri Lanka, South Asia Peace Institute, Colombo
Sumanasiri
Liyanage, ‘One Step at a Time’: Reflections on the Peace Process in Sri
Lanka 2001-2005, South Asia Peace Institute, Colombo
Tisaranee
Gunasekera, Rampant Rulers,
Sunday Island March 22, 2009
Volume Two,
Foundation for Co-existence, Colombo
****
The above volume consists of
Papers presented at the International Youth Conference on Conflict Resolution
and Peace, Organised by the Peace Trust, Kanyakumari, from October 13 to 15,
2006
Silan Kadirgamar did not participate in the above
Conference as mentioned in the Foreword above. He wrote this on the repeated
request of the editor (having initially declined to write – the war situation
in the country being absolutely tense, full of anxiety and distress), as the
war in Lanka drew to a close in May 2009.Those final months were traumatic for
us Tamils in Lanka, as news filtered in about the suffering, deaths and the
final confinement to hastily created detention camps of some 280,000 men, women
and children. The writer knew pastors and members of his church trapped in the
war zone. Among these was his own 98 year old aunt and her family members who
were among the first to successfully leave the war zone. But not before a lady
in the convoy of buses was shot dead by sniper fire
This was initially meant to be a chapter of about
6000 words. On reading the first few pages Dr. Robinson requested that it be
longer so as to be published as a separate book. His felt that very few people in
India knew the actual facts behind the conflict in Lanka. The above draft was
completed on June 15 2009.
[1]
Santasilan Kadirgamar, a Lankan Tamil, was a founding member of the Movement
for Inter-Racial Justice and Equality and was the President of the Jaffna
Branch. He taught at Jaffna College, the Universities of Colombo and
Jaffna and was later a Research Fellow
and lectured at several universities in
Tokyo.
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